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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Plaintiff/Appellant,

!|
)
>
]

vs.

;

BEAR RIVER MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,

Case No. 880035
Priority No. 14b

ANONA MAUGHAN,
Defendant/Respondent,

]

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Respondent submits to the Utah Court of Appeals the
following brief.
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court was invoked
pursuant to an appeal from a final decision of the First Judicial
District Court, pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(i) UCA.

The Supreme Court

transferred this matter on March 30, 1988, to the Utah Court of
Appeals pursuant to Rule 4A of the Utah Court of Appeals.
Judgment was granted the Respondent in the First Judicial
District Court at a hearing on cross-Motions for Summary Judgment
by both parties.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The sole issue in this case is whether a homeowner
insurance policy covers a collapse of the subject home, which

collapse is the result of two concurrent causes, one cause being an
excluded peril and the other cause being an included peril under
the provisions of the insurance policy.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

This is a case involving the interpretation of an

insurance policy.

The facts are not in dispute.

Both plaintiff

and defendant filed Motions for Summary Judgment, which were heard
simultaneously, with judgment being granted in favor of the
homeowner.

(R. 135-36.)

2.

Mrs. Maughan is a homeowner who had resided in a

single-family dwelling in Wellsville, Utah, since 1935.

Her home

had experienced water seepage in the basement beginning in 1973.
(R. 70.)

To alleviate water seepage into the basement in 1986,

Mrs. Maughan hired a contractor, who excavated around the exterior
perimeter of the foundation on June 2, 1986, for the purpose of
installing a drain. After excavating around three sides of the
home, the contractor began excavation on the fourth side, when the
rear foundation wall broke loose of its moorings, the bottom of the
wall slid into the recently dug trench and the top of the foundation wall fell into the basement of the house.

The floor and roof

structure collapsed, severely compromising the home's structural
integrity.
3.

The house has since been demolished.

(R. 70.)

In 1985 Bear River Mutual wrote a homeowner's

insurance policy (a copy of which policy is included in plaintiff's
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insurance policy (a copy of which policy is included in plaintiff's
Brief as Addendum No. 1) on Mrs. Maughan's property.
policy has two applicable provisions.

(R. 52.)

The

The first such provision

relates to the collapse of a building:
This policy insures against direct loss to
the property covered by the following perils
as defined and limited herein:
14. Collapse of buildings or any part thereof
but excluding loss to outdoor equipmentf awnings,
fences, pavements, patiosf swimming poolsf underground pipesf flues, drains, cesspools and septic
tanks, foundations, retaining walls, bulkheads,
piers, wharves, or docks, all except as the
direct result of the collapse of a building.
Collapse does not include settling, cracking,
bulging or expansion.
The second applicable provision relates to subsurface water:
This policy does not insure against loss:
2. Caused by, resulting from, contributed to
or aggravated by any earth movement, including
but not limited to earthquake, volcanic eruption,
landslide, mudflow, earth sinking, rising or
shifting; . . .
3. Caused by, resulting from, contributed to
or aggravated by any of the following:
(c) water below the surface of the ground,
including that which exerts pressure on or
flows, seeps, or leaks through sidewalks,
driveways, foundations, walls, basement or
other opening in such sidewalks, driveways,
foundations, walls or floors;
* * *

4.

Bear River Mutual Insurance Company hired a structural
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engineer by the name of Arnold Coonf to evaluate the building prior
to demolition.

Both Bear River Mutual and Mrs. Maughan regard

Mr. Coon's evaluation as accurate and both parties are willing to
rely upon his report, including his description of the factual
events and conclusions.

Mr. Coon sets forth in his Affidavit that:

9. The soil is a sandy silt which has very
little stability when wet and unconfined. As
the excavation as madef the lateral support
(or confinement) of the soil under the footings
was destroyed. Any dewatering of the trench
for installation of the drain pipe would cause
water to move horizontally into the trench from
the surrounding soil. The unstable nature of
the soil would allow some of it to move with
the water. This combination caused the footings
and foundation walls to be undermined. With
lack of support, they failed and slid into the
trench. There was evidence that the excavated
soil flowed almost like a chocolate milk shake
when it was dumped onto the ground along side
of the trench. A competent contractor should
have noticed this and been aware of the danger
he was creating by his actions and should have
taken measures o prevent such a failure from
happening. (R. 29, 56.)
Mr. Coon also states that:
In my opinion, the failure of the foundation
walls of the Maughan home was "caused by, resulting from, contributed to or aggravated by"
water below the surface or ground water, as the
soil moved from underneath the foundation walls
into the newly excavated trench, carrying the
soild from underneath the foundation walls.
(R. 29.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
It is Bear River Mutual1s position that the collapse of
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the home was caused by the subsurface water under the basement
floor and foundation wall at the time of the collapse; that because
the subsurface water "contributed to" or "aggravated" the
situation, the collapse is an excluded peril under paragraphs 2 and
3 of the policy providing for exclusions.
It is the homeowner's position that had it not been for
the excavation by the contractor—a covered peril—the collapse
would not have occurred, and that even though the subsurface water
was a contributing factor, the acts of the contractor were the
"proximate cause" of the collapse.

ARGUMENT
I
WHAT WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE LOSS?
In cases in which there is more than one cause, or
intervening causes, causing a disaster, the authorities and the
courts use the term "proximate cause" to determine liability.

The

efficient, proximate, or dominate cause which produced the injury
is the cause which ultimately determines whether the loss is a
covered or excluded peril under an insurance policy.
The insurance policy which is the subject of this lawsuit,
provides for coverage of a collapse of the home (page 2, 1(14) and
excludes coverage for damage caused by subsurface water (page 3, K2
& 3c). In this case, there was a collapse in which subsurface
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water was "a" cause.

The legal issue is:

What was the "proximate"

causef if any?
Plaintiff totally ignored this issue at the trial court,
and again ignores it in its Brief.

Nonetheless, the issue remains:

Was the excavation by the contractor the proximate cause of the
collapse, and if so, what is the legal effect?

II
PROXIMATE CAUSE OP THE LOSS IS THE ONE WHICH
DETERMINES WHETHER THE PERIL IS INSURED AGAINST.
Couch on Insur_aLnce 2d, discusses in considerable detail
the subject of "proximate cause."
attached as Appendix A.)

(Vol. 18 f Pages 1008-1026,

While the entire section on "proximate

cause" in Cojoch is pertinentf the essential paragraphs are:
1(74:696 Generally
When loss is sustained by the insured it is necessary that
the loss be proximately, rather than remotely, caused by
the peril insured against.
In order to establish liability within the coverage of an
insurance policy the loss must result from an act or
operation covered by the policy, it must be the proximate
result thereof and unless it is there is no liability.
The principles of causation should not be so closely
applied as to defeat the intent of the parties as
manifested in the contract of insurance.
Proximate cause must be determined from the factual basis
presented upon mixed consideration of logicf common sense,
justice, policy, and precedents.
1174:706. Causal relation distinguished.
It is necessary to distinguish between causal relation and
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the concept of proximate cause. Causal relation requires
only a cause and effect relationship or sequence whereas
proximate cause imposes an element of nearness or
proximateness of the cause to the effect or result. Thusf
a cause which is remote is not a "proximate cause," even
though it is in the line of causation.
1(74:709. Train of events test.
A cause is proximate when it sets in motion a chain of
events which result in the loss without the intervention
of any new or independent force.
Where the peril specifically insured against sets other
causes in motion which, in an unbroken sequence and
connection between the act and the final injury, produce
the final result for which the insured seeks to recover
under his policy, the peril insured against will be
regarded as the proximate cause of the entire loss, so as
to render the insurer liable for the entire loss within
the limits fixed by the policy.
Proximate cause is that which, in a natural sequence,
unbroken by any new cause, produces the result which would
not otherwise have occurred. It is to be noted that this
statement confuses the concept of causation with that of
proximateness and in effect would appear to state that as
long as there is an identifiable chain of cause and effect
the initiating event is to be deemed the "proximate" cause.
Illustrative of the train of events situation, it has been
held that a proximate cause is the cause that naturally
and probably leads to the result; the cause that in the
existing conditions would be reasonably expected to
produce the result; the cause which in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause produces the result and without which the result
would not have occurred.
Similarly it has been held that defining it as "that cause
which in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any
new cause, produces death, and without which death would
not have occurred" was not erroneous for failure to
include the element of "foreseeableness and anticipation
of an injury or the result of such injury."
1(74:710 - Foreseeability.
In some instances, cases have qualified the train of
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events concept by the requirement, characteristic of tort
law, of the element of foreseeability, holding that a
cause is not proximate unless the harm sustained was a
foreseeable consequence thereof.
1174:711. Efficient cause.
In some cases, the concept of proximate cause is defined
in terms of the efficient cause or the efficient moving
cause. Thus, it has been said that the proximate cause
of the happening of a contingency insured against is the
fundamental, efficient moving cause thereof. Similarly,
it has been said that proximate cause is the efficient
cause; the one that necessarily sets the other causes in
motion.
A direct and proximate cause is the active and efficient
cause that sets in motion a train of events which bring
about a result withcmt_tjte_^
starting and working actively and efficiently from a new
and independent source.
(Emphasis and underlining supplied.)
Bear River Mutual's expert, Arnold W. Coon, a structural
engineer, did an investigation of this disaster and filed a report
and an Affidavit in this matter.

Paragraph 9 of his report, which

is also included in his Affidavit, supports the proposition that
the excavation by the contractor was the "proximate cause" of the
collapse.
The soil is a sandy silt which has very little stability
when wet and unconfined. As the excavation was made, the
lateral support (or confinement) of the soil under the
footings was destroyed. Any dewatering of the trench for
installation of the drain pipe would cause water to move
horizontally into the trench from the surrounding soil.
The unstable nature of the soil would allow some of it to
move with the water. This combination caused the footings
and foundation walls to be undermined. With lack of
support, they failed and slid into the trench. There was
evidence that the excavated soil flowed almost like a
chocolate milk shake when it was dumped onto the ground
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along side of the trench. A competent contractor should
have noticed this and been aware of the danger he was
creating by his actions and should have then taken
measures to prevent such a failure from happening.
(Emphasis added.)
Certainly the subsurface water was a contributing cause of
the collapse, as stated by Mr. Coonf but he also states that it was
not the proximate cause:

"A competent contractor should have

noticed this and been aware of the danger he was creating by his
actions and should have then taken measures to prevent such a
failure from happening."
remote cause.

The subsurface water was a casual or

There was an intervening forcef which set into

motion the train of events which caused the collapse of the home,
namely: the excavation performed by the contractor.
Had no effort been made to excavate around the home the
home would never had collapsed.

Subsurface water had existed

around the basement of the home since 1973.

Only on the day of

excavation in 1986f did the house collapse.

Mrs. Maughan is not

claiming loss as a result of damage caused by the subsurface water
or earth movementf but is claiming loss for the collapse of the
home caused by the excavation.

It is not the casual or remote

cause which determines liability of the insurance company, but the
efficient, proximate, or dominate cause.
The case law supports this conclusion.
In Wygtt v.L-NpjL^ygA^g?JL-^Jr-u_aA Insurance Co. of Seattle,
304 F.Supp. 781, (attached as Appendix B) homeowners filed suit
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against their insurance company, which had issued a policy on their
home, for damage suffered to their home as a result of certain
third-parties doing excavating work on contiguous property, causing
the removal of the lateral support to the foundation wall.

The

insurance company defended on the basis that the policy excluded
losses "caused by, resulting from, contributing to or aggravated by
any earth movement. . ." (at 782)—which language as is identical
to the language in the present policy.

There was no question in

Wy^tt that there was "earth movement."

But the Court said "it

would appear that the distinction should be drawn between an
excluded event which is a cause and such an event which is the
inevitable result of another event." (At 783.)
The Wyatt Court overturned the insurance company's Motion for
Summary Judgment and remanded the case to the lower court for trial
stating that it was now a question of fact for the jury to
determine whether the movement of earth was a result of actions
caused by third parties.

The court gave the lower court the

directive that:
If in fact at the trial it is established that actions of
the third or fourth-party defendants or others caused such
(earth movement) then the policy will be held by the court
to cover plaintiff's provable damage and the exclusionary
clause held not applicable. (At 784.)
In S£bel^a_y^J?isl_e_r, 377 P.2d 889, (attached as Appendix C)
the California Supreme Court was faced with a fact situation in
which the homeowner's home, which had been built on a compacted
land fill, settled "to uneven elevations" as a result of a leak in
-10-

the sewer outflow from the house, which infiltrated the unstable
earth near and below the foundation. (At 892.)

The Court found

that the cause of the sewer pipe breaking and leaking was either
the result of settling and consolidation of the inadequately
compacted fill material upon which the pipe was placed or the
improper closure of certain joints in the pipe, or "a combination
of both these causes." (At 892.)

Claim was made by the Plaintiff

against both the builder and Plaintiff's insurance company which
had issued a policy of insurance on the home.

The insurance

company defended on the basis that the policy did not insure
against loss from "settling, cracking, shrinkage, or expansion of
pavements, foundations, walls, floors or ceiling; unless loss by
. . . collapse of building insues."
Plaintiff took the position that the insurance policy
covered the loss because the damage was the result of a rupture of
the sewer line attributable to the negligence of a third-party,
rather than settling.

The Court agreed, finding that the acts of

third-parties were the efficient proximate cause of the loss.

The

Court quoted ^ch_o_n Insurance* and stated:

*"[Iln determining whether a loss is within an exception in a policy,
where there is a concurrence of different causes, the efficient
cause—the one that sets others in motion—is the cause to which
the loss is to be attributed, though the other causes may follow it
and operate more immediately in producing the disaster." (See 6
Couch, Insurance (1930), §1463 P.5298.)
-11-

The virtual absence of subsidence damage in the prior
four years in the existence of the house here in question
clearly indicates that the broken pipe was the predominating or moving efficient cause of the loss. (At 895.)
The Court also analyzed the case from the perspective of "but for"
the acts of third-parties, finding that the settling of the house
would not have occurred "but for" the leak in the sewer pipe; i.e.f
acts of third-parties. Hencef the loss was covered by the insurance
policy.
The insurance company attempted to defend on the basis
that damage would not have occurred "but for" the settling of the
underlying earth.

The court denied this argument on the basis that

the sewer leak was the peril "proximately" causing the loss, which
was immediate in time of the occurrence of the damage.
In discussing the concept of "proximate causation" in
Sabella the California Supreme Court cited other cases involving
insurance policies in which proximate causation was an issue. Six
cases were citedf but the example from only one is necessary here
to prove the point.

The case involved an insuredf suffering from

incurable cancerf an excluded perilf who died in a fire. The
holding of the case was that the insurance company was liable to
honor the terms of its policy covering the insured on the basis
that the fire set in progress the chain of events leading directly
to the death, which was the prime or moving cause of deathf even
though the insured was likely to die of cancer in the near future
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anyway.

See BrjK>ks_v^ Metjrj^poljJ^an^^

163 P.2d 689.

27 Cal. 2d 305,

Cited in Sabellja at 896.

In Vormelker v. Oleksinski, 199 N.W.2d 287, (attached as
Appendix D) a homeowner hired a contractor to build a home on a
large unstable land mass.

A subsequent owner took possession of

the home which thereafter experienced damage as a result of earth
movement under the home rendering it uninhabitable. The homeowner
filed claim with his insurance company, which defended the action
on the basis that there had not been a complete collapse and that
the insurance policy excluded damage caused by "earthquake,
landslide or other earth movement."

To determine whether the

exclusionary provisions of the insurance policy applied, this Court
also addressed the "proximate cause" issue and the "but for"
argument.
All of the experts agreed that earth movement caused the
damage to the house, but there was also expert testimony
that the foundation to the house was inadequate and that
had the foundation been adequately constructed, the
collapse would not have occurred.
It is our opinion that the exclusions contained in the
policy apply only when it can be shown that earth movement
et cetera was the sole cause of the damage. If it can be
shown that the building was improperly constructed (taking
into consideration the type of soil, the geography of the
area et cetera) and "but for" the inadequate construction
the building would not have collapsed even with the earth
movement, then the damage should come under the protection
of the policy. One of the primary purposes of a policy
such as this is to protect against faulty workmanship or
planning. (At 295.) (Emphasis added.)
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Applying the law of Wya_tt, SabelJLa. and Vormeljcejc to the
present casef the pertinent questions are:
from underneath the foundation walls?
excavated trench"?

Why did the soil move

Was it because of "the newly

What caused the newly excavated trench to

exist?
Plaintiff's expert provides the answers.

According to Mr.

Coon " . . . the soil moved from underneath the foundation walls
into the newly excavated trench, carrying the soil from underneath
the foundation walls."

(Aff. p. 2.) "As the excavation was made,

the lateral support (or confinement) of the soil under the footings
was destroyed. * * *

A competent contractor should have noticed

this and been aware of the danger he was creating by his actions
and should have taken measures to prevent such a failure from
happening."

(Report 1(9 f Aff. p. 2.) (R. 29, 56.)

Had it not been for the excavation by the contractor the
house would not have collapsed.

Ill
COLLAPSE WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED
"BUT FOR" EXCAVATION BY CONTRACTOR
The Courts in SabelJLa and VojnnelJke_r raise the "but for"
argument as one step in determining proximate causation.
^nsuranee 2d, also relies upon the "but for" cause:
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Cojich^^on

§74:713.

"But for" cause.

In defining proximate cause, it has been held that the
peril insured against must be the sole proximate cause of
that loss, so causing and so connected with the loss that
it could not otherwise have been produced.
Defendant had experienced serious water problems in the
basement since 1973.

The fact that the house had not experienced

any settling in the prior 14 years and that it collapsed
simultaneous with the excavation, certainly leads to the conclusion
that "but for" the excavation by the contractor the house would not
have collapsed.

It was the acts of the contractor which were the

predominating or moving efficient cause of the loss—not subsurface
water.

IV
PLAINTIFFS CASES DO NOT PARALLEL THE
PRESENT FACT SITUATION
Appellant's Brief relies on the theory espoused in Stewart
¥^_JLL§f^JL:rf:^_^

477 P.2d 966 and Krug_j^L

MiilejAL Mu t ua 1 Insurance As so c i_a t i on of 111 i no is, 495 P.2d 949.
In ^tewart a home was built on a mine shaft and it sank.
The court determined the exclusion for earth movement was
applicable.

Defendant herein has no quarrel with the law of this

casef but the fact situation does not contain an intervening cause
which was the proximate cause of the disaster.
even applicable.
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The case is not

In Kni£ the homeowner attempted to recover damages to
his home resulting from a "collapse" within the terms of the
policy.

In fact/ the east wall of Plaintiff's kitchen had

"separated from the ceiling" (at 951) as a result of settling due
to a plumbing leak.

The house was not rendered structurally

unsound or uninhabitable and thus the court found it had "settled,"
rather than "collapsed."

(The court relied upon language in Sabella

v^Jtfj_ser, previously cited herein, regarding settling; but the
court in SabeJJja found the settling to be so extensive as to render
the home uninhabitable and therefore collapsed.)

V
PUBLIC POLICY UNDERLINING
CONTRACTS FOR INSURANCE
In the Wyatt casef supra, the court dealt with the issue
of the rationale behind exclusionary clauses in insurance policies,
which issue the Plaintiff raised with the court.
Plaintiffs assert that the reason for the insertion of the
exclusionary clause above quoted in all risk insurance
policies is to relieve the insurer from occasional major
disasters which are almost impossible to predict and thus
to insure against. There are earthquakes or floods which
cause a major catastrophe and wreak damage to everyone in
a large area rather than one individual policyholder. When
such happens, the very basis upon which insurance companies
operate is said to be destroyed. When damage is so widespread no longer can insurance companies spread the risk
and offset a few or the the average percentage of losses
by many premiums. Looking at the special exclusionary
clause in the policy here in question, it seems to cover
situations where one single event could adversely affect
a large number of policyholders. Besides the particular
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clause which is before this court the insurer also
excludes floodsf tidal wavesr a back up of water below the
surface, changes in temperature and changes in the law.
All of these are phenomena likely to affect great numbers
of people when they occur.
This gives some force to the view that the various
exclusions were not intended to cover the situation as
here where "earth movement" occurred under a single
dwelling, allegedly due to human action of third persons
in the immediate vicinity of the damage. It seems hard to
contend that the insurance policy meant to exclude all
earth movements, for it is difficult to distinguish
between a situation where a piece of heavy equipment
breaks loose and hits a house causing serious damage and a
situation where that equipment instead hits only an
embankment next to a house but causes the earth to move
and thereby damages the house. Certainly not all earth
movements, or at least those where some human action
causes such are included in the exclusion. If this
interpretation creates an ambiguity in the language then
it is necessary to decide what earth movements were
intended to be covered. The class cited in the
exclusionary clause is therefore held, if not limited to
natural phenomena, at least not to exclude coverage in the
case at bar.
There is no dispute in Wyatjt that the policy covered acts
of third-parties.

The present case also involves a similar fact

situation in which a third party, excavating around a home—a
single rather than a widespread event—caused the collapse of
Defendant's home.

VI
AMBIGUITY TO BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OP COVERAGE
If there be any ambiguity in the subject insurance policy
by virtue of there being a provision insuring against collapse and

-17-

a provision excluding coverage for damage occasioned by subsurface,
the ambiguity is to be resolved in favor of the insured.
Since a policy is drawn by the insurer, ambiguities are
construed against the insurer.
S_Sonsr 665 P.2d 1308 (1983).

DtaJ^ajjnJtar^
(Other citations omitted.)

CONCLUSION
The subsurface water problems experienced by Defendant set
in motion the "train of events" which ultimately led to the
collapse of Mrs. Maughan's home.

But there was an intervening

force and one which was controllable by human actions.

That event

was the contractor's excavation around three sides of the home.
It is clear that the home had experienced subsurface water
problems for 14 years and had not collapsed during that time.

Only

on June 2, 1986, after the contractor removed the earth around the
foundation walls did the foundation walls collapse.

"But for" the

acts of the contractor, the house would be standing today.
It is the train of events set in motion by the contractor
which caused the collapse of the home, not the train of events set
in motion by the subsurface water.

Prior to the excavation, there

is no evidence that there was any earth movement because of the
subsurface water leading to a potential collapse.
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Couch on JCnsurance^dr and the cases cited hereinf all
rely upon the issue of "proximate causation" and treat earth
movement and subsurface water as a casual relation in like cases.
In this particular case, the proximate causation of the collapse of
the home was the excavation by the contractor, not earth movement.
Plaintiff, in its Memorandum for Summary Judgementf
completely ignores the issue of "proximate cause" of the
contractor.

It is a factor which can not be ignored.

Had it not

been for the contractor, the house would not have collapsed.

As a

result, the peril which caused the damage was insured against.
The judgment of the Trial Court should be upheld.
DATED this _((__ day of May, 1988.

/-JiLi
TjBgmLD

S. JEN

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed four true and correct
copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent this ^^__'day of May,
1988, postage prepaid, to appellant's attorney:
Thomas A. Duffin
JENSEN, DUFFIN, DIBB & JACKSON
311 South State, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah
BUyil
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J 74:695. Sprinkler damage insurance.
Under a policy insuring against damage from accidental discharge of
in automatic sprinkler, negligence of the insured, his agent, servant, or
Dthers, not amounting to fraud, though the direct cause of an accident
md loss, is covered by, and does not defeat, a policy of insurance.19
i* A provision in a policy against accidental discharge of an automatic
sprinkler, that it does not cover loss or damage caused by the neglect
of the insured to use all reasonable means to save and preserve the
property insured, refers to the means to be used, after the occurrence
of the accident causing the loss, to prevent greater loss than is
aecessa y, and not to any act of negligence causing the accident and
loss."

In order to establish liability within the coverage of an insurance
policy the loss must result from an act or operation covered by the
policy, it must be the proximate result thereof and unless it is there is
no liability.2
The principles of causation should not be so closely applied as to
defeat the intent of the parties as manifested in the contract of
insurance.8
Proximate cause must be determined from the factual basis presented
upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, justice, policy, and
precedents.4

§ 74:695

B. PROXIMATE CAUSE

§ 74:697

§ 74:697. Policy provision.
Whether a policy speaks of proximate cause or equivalent terms, loss
is significant when resulting from a specified peril only if the loss is the
proximate result of the operation of the peril. This is true whether the

1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

5 74:696. Generally.
\t When loss is sustained by the insured it is necessary that the loss be
proximately, rather than remotely, caused by the peril insured against.1
iTnmp. Co. (1886) 117 US 312, 29 L
frEd 873, 6 SCt 750, 1176.
19. Wertheimer-Swarts Shoe Co. v
: United States Casualty Co. (1903) 172
Mo 135, 72 SW 635.
KO. Wertheimer-Swarts Shoe Co. v
United States Casualty Co., supra.
L Smith v Universal Ins. Co. (1821) 19
, US 176, 185, 5 L Ed 235, 237; Waters
v Merchants Louisville Ins. Co. (1837)
36 US 213, 9 L Ed 691; General Mut.
Ins. Co. v Sherwood (1853) 55 US 351,
366, 19 L Ed 452, 458; Insurance Co. v
•* Boon (1877) 95 US 117, 24 L Ed 395;
r Mulkr v Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins.
iCo. (CA) 246 F 759; Princess Garment
I Co. v Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (1940,
| C A 6 Ohio) 115 F2d 380. See, Fidelity
I & Casualty Co. v Griner (1930, CA9
jL Cal) 44 F2d 706; Commercial Casualty
v Ins. Co. v Stinson (1940, CA6 Mich)
U 1 1 F 2 63, ce* -u 311 US 667, 85 L
Ed 42c, 61 S Ct 25; Mandles v Guardian Life Ins. Co. (1940, CA10 Colo)
I 115 F2d 994; Winsor v Massachusetts
I Mot Life Ins. Co. (1941) 30 Ala App
1008

64, 200 So 641. See, National Life &
Acci. Ins. Co. v McGhee (1939) 238
Ala 471, 191 So 884; Fogarty v Fidelity
& Casualty Co. (1937) 122 Conn 245,
188 A 481; Szymanska v Equitable Life
Ins. Co. (1936) 37 Dei 272, 183 A 309;
Case v Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1852) 13
111 676; Carter v Aetna Life Ins. Co.
(1940) 217 Ind 282, 27 NE2d 75; Kokomo Life & Ace. Ins. Co. v Wolford
(1929) 90 Ind App 395, 167 NE 156,
Slaughter v Columbus Mut. Life Ins
Co. (1932) 214 Iowa 451, 240 NW 229;
Beckley v New York Life Ins. Co.
(1940) 229 Iowa 1007, 295 NW 844;
National Life & Acci. Ins. Co. v Cox
(1917) 174 Ky 683, 192 SW 636;
Guardian Life Ins. Co. v Robison
(1939) 278 Ky 678, 129 SW2d 192;
McCargo v New Orleans Ins. Co.
(1845, La) 10 Rob 202; Caballeno &
Basualdo v Home Mut. Ins. Co. (1860)
15 La Ann 217; Bouchard v Prudential
Ins. Co. (1937) 135 Me 238, 194 A
405; Freeman v Mercantile Mut. Ace.
Ass'n (1892) 156 Mass 351, 30 NE
1013; Lynn Gas & Electric Co. v Meriden Fire Ins. Co. (1893) 158 Mass 570,

33 NE 690; Jiannetti v National Fire
Life Ins. Co. v Firestone (1932) 159
Ins. Co. (1931) 277 Mass 434, 178 NE
Okla 228, 15 P2d 141; Hillier v Alle640; Wrobcl v General Acci. Fire &
gheny County Mut. Ins. Co. (1846) 3
Life Assur. Corp (1934) 288 Mass 206,
Pa 470; Goldenberg v Equitable life
192 NE 498, Russell v German F. Ins.
Assur. Soc (1934) 113 Pa Super 414,
Co (1907) 100 Minn 528. I l l NW 400
173 A 445; Tannenbaum v Connecticut
(ovrld Strobel v Chicago, R. I. & P. R.
Fire Ins. Co. (1937) 127 Pa Super 278,
Co, 255 Minn 201, 96 NW2d 195);
193 A 305. See, Neely v Provident Life
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc. v St. Paul Mer& Acci. Ins. Co. (1936) 322 P i 417,
cury Indem. Co. (1954) 242 Minn 91,
185 A 784; Troupe v Benefit Asso. of
64 NW2d 380 (ovrld on other grounds
Railway Employees (1930) 57 SD 147,
Woodnch Constr. Co, v Indemnity
231 NW 529; McBurgess v Federal
Ins. Co 252 Minn 86, 89 NW2d 412);
Life Ins. Co. (1927) 5 Tenn App 284;
Delametter v Home Ins. Co. (1938) 233
Federal Life Ins. Co. v Raley (1937)
Mo App 645, 126 SW2d 262; Rieger v
130 Tex 408, 109 SW2d 972; Lavender
Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1937) 234 Mo
v Continental Life Ins. Co. (1927) 143
App 93, 110 SW2d 878. See, Schepman
Wash 201, 253 P 595; Hanley v Occiv Mutual Ben Health & Acci. Ass'n
dental Life Ins. Co. (1931) 164 Wash
231 Mo App 651, 104 SW2d 777;
320, 2 P2d 636.
Runyon v Monarch Ace. Ins Co.
2.
Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v Gil(1932) 108 NJL 489, 158 A 530;
more, Gardner & Kirk Oil Co. (1946,
Cramer v John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
CA10 Okla) 157 F2d 929.
Co (1940) 18 NJ Misc 367, 13 A2d
651; City F. Ins. Co. v Corlies (NY) 21
3.
Fogarty v Fidelity & Casualty Co.
Wend 367; Patrick v Commercial Ins.
(1935) 120 Conn 296, 180 A 458; Haik
Co (NY) 11 Johns 14; Gates v Madiv United States Fidelity & Guaranty
son County Mut. Ins. Co. (1851) 5 NY
Co. (1931) 15 La App 97, 130 So 118.
469; Babcock v Montgomery County
Mut. Ins. Co. (NY) 6 Barb 637, affd 4 4. Szymanska v Equitable Life Ins. Co.
NY 326; German Fire Ins. Co. v Roost
(1936) 37 Del 272, 183 A 309; Mer(1897) 55 Ohio St 581, 45 NE 1097;
chants Co. v Hartford Acci. & Indem.
Kenney v Occidental Ins. Co. (1940) 66
Co. (1939) 187 Miss 301, 188 So 571,
Ohio App 284, 20 Ohio Ops 95, 32
sugg of error overr 187 Miss 309, 192
Ohio L Abs 631, 34 NE2d 237; Federal
So 566.
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effect of holding that there is a proximate relationship is to bring the
loss within the coverage of the policy or to exclude it from coverage by
making an exception applicable.
h The words, "consequences resulting therefrom," used in an insurance
against loss*- from the "derangement or breaking of the engine or
mawhinery,M mean an immediate or proximate, but not a remote,
consequence.*

* I
§ 74:698! Statutory regulation.
In some jurisdictions, the subject of proximate cause and remote
cause in connection with liability on contracts of insurance is regulated
by express statutory provision, such as that "an insurer is liable for a
loss of which a peril insured against was the proximate cause, although
a peril not contemplated -by the contract may have been the remote
cause of the loss; but he is not liable for a loss of which the peril
insured against was only a remote cause. "•

i • tt
§ 74:699, Burden of proof.
^ In an action to recover on a double indemnity provision of a life
^policy, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish by preponderance of
the evidence that the accidental injury was the proximate cause of
insured's death.7
I To recover under a double indemnity clause of the life policy
Wering death resulting from bodily injury effected solely through
fexternal, violent, and accidental means, the plaintiff has the burden of
iproof to show that insured died as the direct and proximate result of
lexternal, violent, and accidental means.8
f § 74:700, Questions of law or fact.
I* The question of proximate cause is generally held to be one for the
* trier of facts.*

i

5. Orient Ins "o. v Adams (1887) 123
g,
i 67, 31 L Ed 63, 8 S Ct 68.
$. Board" of Ed. v Alliance Assur. Co

g

I P t i S F S*?* 1 r / v willed na908"
1

9. Muller v Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins
Co 1917 CA2 N Y 246 F 759; Fairc

^r^.aW?^K

ffi

« I % V ? VA&fin
*Ct 690 Pacmc
581, 53 L Ed 660, 29 SCI 690^ Pacific
Heating A Ventilatmg 0 , . v W t a u j
(
}
S^ 8 £« C , f?t£ i r f lm'
Cal 367, 111 P 4.
7. Carter v Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1940)
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217 Ind 282, 27 NE2d 75.
W i n s o r v Massachusetts Mut Life Ins
Co. (1941) 30 Ala App 64, 200 So 641.

-<

lou

'

>

*

* n v F , d e , i t y & <***%<*.
Q9U)
5 4 °.
DC 2 8 6 2 97 F 681; Princess
^ v'Fircman>s F u n d Ini.
G j ^ t
Co. (1940, CA6 Ohio) 115 F2d 380;
Western Assur. Co. v Hann (1917) 201
Ala 376, 78 So 232; National Life &
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Acci. Ins. Co. v McGhee (1939) 238
Ala 471, 191 So 884; Winsor v Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins Co. (1941) 30
Ala App 64, 200 So 641; Prudential
Ins. Co v Crolcy (1940) 199 Ark 630,
135 SW2d 322; Hall v General Acci.
Assur Corp (1915) 16 Ga App 66, 85
SE 600, Phcnix Ins. Co. v Jones (1915)
16 Ga App 261, 85 SE 206; Pacific
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v Meldrim (1919) 24
Ga App 487, 101 SE 305; Rowden v
Travelers Protective Asso. (1916) 201
111 App 295; Rebenstorf v Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. (1939) 299 HI App 71, 19
NE2d 420, Carter v Aetna Life Ins.
Co. (1940) 217 Ind 282, 27 NE2d 75;
Foster v North American Acci. Ins.
Co. (1916) 176 Iowa 399, 158 NW 401;
Carpenter v Security Fire Ins. Co.
(1918) 183 Iowa 1226, 168 NW 231;
Tracy v Palmetto Fire Ins. Co. (1928)
207 Iowa 1042, 222 NW 447 (fire in
automobile as proximate cause of damages caused by running it into ditch in
effort to put out fire); Beckley v New
York Life Ins. Co. (1940) 229 Iowa
1007, 295 NW 844; Williams v General
Ace. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. (1936)
144 Kan 755, 62 P2d 856; Guardian
Life Ins Co. v Robison (1939) 278 Ky
678, 129 SW2d 192; Todd v Traders' &
Mechanics' Ins Co. (1918) 230 Mass
595, 120 NE 142, Kangas v New York
Life Ins Co. (1923) 223 Mich 238, 193
NW 867, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co v
Wilhams (1938) 180 Miss 894, 178 So
477; Beckerleg v Locomotive Engineers' Mut. Life & Acci. Ins. Ass'n
(1925, Mo App) 274 SW 917; Smith v
Washington Nat Ins. Co. (Mo App) 91
SW2d 169, Schepman v Mutual Ben.
Health & Acci Ass'n (1937) 231 Mo
App 651, 104 SW2d 777; Delametter v
Home Ins. Co. (1938) 233 Mo App
645, 126 SW2d 262, Eagan v Prudential Ins. Co. (1939) 234 Mo App 295,
128 SW2d 1085; United Mut. Fire Ins.
Co. v Jamestown Mut. Ins. Co. (1934)
242 App Div 420, 275 NYS 47, affd
267 NY 576, 196 NE 587; Kenney v
Occidental Ins Co (1940) 66 Ohio
App 284, 20 Ohio Ops 95, 32 Ohio L
Abs 631, 34 NE2d 237; Jones v Commonwealth Casualty Co. (1917) 255 Pa
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566, 100 A 450, Kelley v Piwsourgn
Casualty Co. (1917) 256 Pa 1, 100 A
494, Kelly v Prudential Ins. Co. (1939)
334 Pa 143, 6 A2d 55; Johnson v
Kentucky Cent. Life A Acci. Ins. Co.
(1941) 144 Pa Super 116, 18 A2d 507;
Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v Edwards (1919, Tex Civ App) 210 SW
856 wnt dism woj; North American
Ace. Ass'n v Adams (1930, Tex Civ
App) 32 SW2d 525; Washington Fidelity Nat. Ins. Co. v Williams (1930, Tex
Civ App) 33 SW2d 796 (death # as
caused by exposure or by injury received while repairing automobile tire),
revd on other grounds (Tex Com App)
49 SW2d 1093; McVeigh v International Travelers Assur. Co. (1936, Tex
Civ App) 101 SW2d 644, writ dism
woj, Browning v Equitable Life Assur.
(1938) 94 Utah 570, 80 P2d 348; Kubey v Travelers' Protective Ass'n
(1920) 109 Wash 453, 187 P 335; Kearney v Washington Nat. Ins. Co. (1935)
184 Wash 579, 52 P2d 903; Kane v
Order of United Commercial Travelers
(1940) 3 Wash 2d 355, 100 P2d 1036;
Pierce v Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co.
(1941) 7 Wash 2d 151, 109 P2d 322;
Egan v Travelers Ins. Co. (1937) 224
Wis 596, 273 NW 68.
: »$&.
* Where insured, seeking recovery under a windstorm policy, adduced evidence of damage and relied upon a
hypothesis developed from weather
data and other circumstances to show
that wind damaged the property during
a storm, and insurer by an expert wit*
ness and other evidence attempted "to
demonstrate that building collapsed
from weight of snow on the roof, question of causation was one for the jury,
and verdict for the insurer would not
be disturbed Sussex Poultry Co.$v
American Ins. Co. (1973, Del Sup) 301
A2d 281.
rfr
In action on policy covering death
caused directly, exclusively and independently of all other causes, from
external, violent and purely accidental
means, question of proximate cause of
the insured's death after he was involved in an automobile accident was
for the jury. Lincoln American Life
nt
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| Where the breach of a condition must have caused the loss in order
to avail the insurer, the question is for the jury if the evidence leaves it
in doubt," j
I Where,there is competent evidence on the question of proximate
cause from which reasonable men might draw different conclusions, the
question is one for the jury to determine."
Peril of the sea is not the proximate cause as a matter of law of
damage to a cargo of rice within the meaning of a marine policy,
where the jury found that the damage was proximately caused by a
closing of the ventilators and hatches and where the weather encountered was normal and to be anticipated and no weather rendered it
necessary to close the ventilators for the safety of the ship, and the
ventilators were not closed for a longer period than would be in
contemplation of the parties.11
§ 74:701. --Concurrent causes.
Where more than one cause contributes to an injury, and if there is
doubt, or if prudent persons could draw different conclusions, the
question as to which of the contributing causes is the efficient, proximate, dominant cause is one for the jury.w
| Where the question is whether the insured building was destroyed by
fire, or by an explosion of dynamite which occurred a few minutes
prior to the fire, and the evidence is conflicting, a finding of the jury
• - * • • * •

In* Co.!v Ruscoe (1968, Miss) 210 So
2d 769.1
rfheie question presented to the jury
is whether the loss was due to windstorm within coverage or to water
within exclusion, the entire question of
proximate cause is treated as one of
fact independent of the explicit application of any rule of law. Grace v Lititz
Mut Ins. Co. (1972, Miss) 257 So 2d
217.
Generally, it is for the trier of fact to
determine the dominant and efficient
cause of a loss. Nassif Realty Corp. v
National Fire Ins. Co. (1968) 109 NH
117, 244 A2d 194, citing Couch 2d.
10. Township Board of Hillman v Empire
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (1931) 253 Mich
394, 235 NW 194, applying Mich Pub
Acts 1921, No. 264 (and holding question of sufficiency of violation by use of

<10I2

motion-picture machine in a public
hall, to be for jury).
11. Casualty Reciprocal Exchange v
Sutfin (1945) 196 Okla 567, 166 P2d
434.
12. Canada Rice Mills v Union Marine &
General Ins. Co. (1939, Canada) 53
Brit Col 440, 2 DLR 306 (CA) (where
the ventilators and hatches were frequently closed because of rain and fog
normal and foreseeable for that time of
year).
13. Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v Whipking
(1930) 96 Ind App 167, 170 NE 548.
Which of two concurring causes was
the proximate cause of loss under a
windstorm policy is a question of fact.
Nassif Realty Corp. v National Fire
Ins. Co. (1968) 109 NH 117, 244 A2d
194, citing Couch 2d.

ACTIONS AND REMEDIES
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that fire was the proximate cause of the destruction will notfh
disturbed.14
||g
The question whether a bridge insured against cyclones, ete.f t»u
excluding injuries by floods, was damaged as the proximate result Jo
floodwaters, or by heavy boats being driven against it by a cyclone
windstorm, or tornado, was held to be one of fact for the jury.1* MM
Whether a windstorm was the efficient and proximate cauJelS
damage to a building within the coverage of an insurance policy o:
whether a blizzard or a snowstorm was the efficient and proximati
cause within the meaning of an exclusionary clause in the policy, is i
question for the jury to determine."
;|? ]
Whether the insured under a collision policy failed to protect th<
automobile after loss when the oil pan struck a pipe projecting fron
the street surface, so as to preclude recovery for loss of the engine bj
lack of oil, was for the jury under evidence that after the collision th<
insured got out and looked under the automobile but assumed the pip<
had struck the exhaust pipe and did not note whether it had struct
and damaged the oil pan, and thereupon drove on until the motoi
knocked and burned out, the issue being whether he was negligent in
failing to ascertain the actual damage by thorough inspection!and
whether such negligence, if any, was an intervening and proximate
cause.17
§ 74:702. —Injury or disease.
It is a question for the jury where there is an issue of fact uporr the
point of whether the proximate cause of insured's death waaWan
accidental injury or a disease from which he was suffering, and the
evidence is of such character that equally prudent persons might draw
different conclusions concerning which of the
contributing causes was
the efficient, dominant, and proximate cause.1*
J^K:
14. Phenix Ins. Co. v Jones (1915) 16 Ga
App 261, 85 SE 206.
15. Phenix Ins. Co. v Charleston Bridge
Co. (1895, CA4 SC) 65 F 628.
16. Anderson v Connecticut Fire Ins. Co.
(1950) 231 Minn 469, 43 NW2d 807.
17.173
Geist v Niagara
FireA2H
Ins. Co. (1953)
1 /J PaSuner
r a bupcr 587
;>»7,98
98 A2d 221
223.

Prudential Ins. Co. v Croley (1940) 199
Ark 630, 135 SW2d 322; Rinaldi v
%f « ' " ^
< £ <l93*> " • ? • •
I 1 9 ' 17£ A ^ i ^ / n 0 ? ^ ^
Assur. Corp. (1915) 16 Ga App 66, 85
SE 600; Kokomo Life & Ace. Ins. Co.
v Wolford (1929) 90 Ind App 395, 167
W l , f
?Continental
LitLl^&
i t ^ r WCo.
TTA
Casualty
v Uoyd
(m5)
J65 U d ^
? 3 N £ g24. ^ J .

18. Clay County Cotton Co. v Home Life
Ins. Co. (1940, CA8 Ark) 113 F2d 856;
Winsor v Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins.
Co. (1941) 30 Ala App 64, 200 So 641;

dent Life & Acci. Ins. Co.
(1935) 259 Ky 320, 82
Guardian Life Ins. Co.
(1939) 278 Ky 678, 129

v Diehlman
SW2d 350;
v Robison
SW2d 192;
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S p i t is a "question of fact for the jury whether the peritonitis from
Itohich.the insured died was directly and proximately caused by an
I accidental injury which he suffered, or whether it was due to an
I intervening operation."
KJ|Whether^ blow to the chest, received by the insured when he fell
I due to the breaking of a stool upon which he was sitting, was directly,
I exclusively, and independently of all other causes the cause of his death
1 through accidental means, where at the time he was suffering from
t arteriosclerosis, which was merely compatible with his age and was in a
gpassive condition at the time of the injury, was a question for the jury
f to determine.10
&The question whether a fall causing death was due to accidental
means independent of any other cause or was due to or contributed to
I by a disease of the heart is for determination by the jury where no one
I saw the deceased fall and no one could tell except by inference what
Ecaused him to fall.1
p f | Where expert testimony is conflicting, the question whether death
Irfrorn cerebral hemorrhage resulted from ptomaine poisoning or from
{Pother sickness is for the jury.1
| p | T h e question whether loss of vision of an eye was due to a retinal
•"hemorrhage of the inside rear portion of the eye and could not have
f been caused by the impact of a grain of sand with the cornea in front
W of the eye, raises an issue for the jury to determine.8

§ 74:703. —Questions of law.
^
Although the question of proximate cause ordinarily is fo* iuc jury^
such is not the case where the facts are undisputed' or there is but one
inference possible from the settled facts.* That is to say, the jury should
not be allowed to speculate, and the question of proximate cause,
should not be submitted to the jury, where there is no substantial]
evidence upon which to base a finding that the loss was proximately!
caused by a risk insured against.7
^m
At the same time, it is only where the evidence is so overwhelmingly
on one side as to preclude an opportunity for reasonable minds ftcr
differ that the court should direct a verdict.'

P

579, 52 P2d 903; Kane v Order of
S Skinner v Commercial Travelers' Mut.
United Commercial Travelers (1940) 3
* Acci Asa'n (1916) 190 Mich 353, 157
Wash 2d 355, 100 P2d 1036, Pierce v
NW 105; Abbott v Travelers Ins. Co.
Pacific Mut Life Ins. Co (1941) 7
:(1920) 208 Mich 654, 176 NW 473;
Wash 2d 151, 109 P2d 322, Egan v
[Hickey v Ministers' Casualty Union
Travelers Ins. Co. (1937) 224 Wis 596,
(1916) 133 Mian 215, 158 NW 45;
273 NW 68; Equitable Life Assur. Soc.
Frommelt v Travelers Ins. Co. (1921)
v Gratiot (1933) 45 Wyo 1, 14 P2d
1150 Mian 66, 184 NW 565; Wheeler v
438.
.Fidelity & Casualty Co. (1923) 298 Mo
[619, 251 SW 924; Moon v Order of
United Commercial Travelers (1914) 96 19. Jones v Commonwealth Casualty Co.
(1917) 255 Pa 566, 100 A 450
[Neb 65, 146 NW 1037; Western Indem
Co. v MacKechnic (1916, Tex Civ 20. Foulkrod v Standard Ace Ins. Co.
rApp) 185 SW 615, later app (Tex Civ
(1942) 343 Pa 505, 23 A2d 430.
App) 214 SW 456; North American
>Acci. Ins. Co. v Miller (1917, Tex Civ 1. Flower v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
^App) 193 SW 750 writ ref; National
(1940, App) 36 Ohio L Abs 381, 44
! » & Acci. Ins. Co. v Weaver (1920,
NE2d 110.
r Tex Civ App) 226 SW 754; Browning v
Equitable Life Assur. Soc. (1938) 94 2. Sutter v Massachusetts Bonding & Ins
Co (1919) 215 111 App 341.
Utah 570, 80 P2d 348; Rorabaugh v
Great Eastern Casualty Co. (1921) 117
Wash 7, 200 P 587; Kearney v Wash- 3. Provident Life & Ace Ins. Co. v Downey (1942) 242 Ala 482, 7 So 2d 17
ington Nat. Ins. Co. (1935) 184 Wash
1014
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§ 74:704. Sufficiency of evidence.
Where deceased had a fall, of which he bore the bruise, and of thel
effects of which he complained several days, when he fell sick and diedj
the jury has a right to believe, where the evidence is conflicting aS|toj
the direct cause of death, that the fall produced the death.*
H$
Causal connection between an accident to the automobile in whichj
insured was riding and an injury to insured is established where thej
4. See §§ 74 700 et seq
5. McBurgess v Federal Life Ins. Co.
(1927) 5 Tenn App 284
6. Muller v Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins.
Co (1917, CA2 NY) 246 F 759; Western Assur Co. v Hann (1917) 201 Ala
376, 78 So 232
7. Parshall v Mechanics & Traders' Ins
Co. (1922, Mo App) 245 SW 354
(holding that there was nothing but
speculative evidence upon which to
base a finding that damage to the insured goods from water from a broken
pipe was caused by fire); Whipple v
Fidelity & Casualty Co. (1922) 134 Va
195, 113 SE 878 (holding that there
was not sufficient evidence to sustain a
finding that blindness resulted from an
accident to, and the extraction of, a
tooth).
8. Clay County Cotton Co. v Home Life
Ins Co (1940, CA8 Ark) 113 F2d 856.
9. Standard Life & Ace. Ins. Co. v
Thomas (1891) 13 Ky LR 593, 17 SW
275

In action on policy covering damage i
to plant's steam piping system and loss!
on property directly damaged by a J
covered accident, there was sufficient J
evidence from which jury could have!
found that damage to turbines was!
direct result of accident that broke^
steam pipes and permitted debris to^
enter where superintendent of powerj*
plant, who had been in charge of re-%
pairs, testified that before accident tur-|«
bines had been sealed and that only *i
explanation for foreign matter inside!
them was breaking, during accident, of jj
steam pipes that led into them. Simkins a
Industries, Inc v Lexington Ins. Co.f
(1979) 42 Md App 396, 401 A2d 181. 1
Finding that insured under acciden-|
tal dismemberment policy lost leg asj
direct result of bodily injuries sustained]
as result of blow to leg could not be*
sustained in absence of expert medical j
testimony establishing a causal relation-J
ship between blow and subsequent in-i
fection and amputation of leg. Lanconj
v Employers Nat. Life Ins. Co (1968,1
Tex Civ App 1st Dist) 424 SW2d 321, \
writ ref n r e.
I
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[accident consisted in the throwing of a stick against the car and the
Jiinjury resulted from its deflection and striking of insured.10
L
%- One may recover on an accident policy if his injury results from
[either of two accidental causes, even though he cannot show which was
[in fact the cause."
fi Where a canalboat was insured, with the privilege of carrying lime in
rels, against fire and other marine perils, and it appeared that due
[care, was taken in loading the lime in a safe condition, and in
>rotecting it thereafter; that while in tow the boat was discovered to be
[onfire,and it was attempted to unload it, but the deck was so hot that
le unloading could not be continued, and the boat was scuttled; and it
appeared that the boat was seaworthy; that smoke was seen
suing from! the hold; that several pieces of heads of barrels were
turned into charcoal; and that pitch oozed from the seams of the boat,
Sowing to intense heat on deck, it was held that fire was the proximate
[cause of the loss."

There is authority which purports to distinguish between the proxi-i
mate cause for insurance law purposes and for tort law purposes on the
ground that foreseeability is not an element of the proximate cause
concept in insurance.18
J
And there is authority that proximate cause in contract actions is
1
not determined by the same principles applicable in tort action. *
j
In view of the wide use of limiting clauses in policies speaking in1
terms of a "sole" cause or similar provisions, it becomes academic to
pursue the matter beyond recognizing that the contract of insurance'
may by its express terms "disqualify" a cause which, in the absence of
such a policy provision or under principles of general tort law, would;
be deemed a proximate cause.17 Thus, it has been held that the doctrine
of proximate cause has no application in ascertaining liability upon^
policies which contain clauses relieving the insurance company from
liability where death is caused or contributed to directly or indirectly,]
or wholly or partially, by disease, and the evidence shows that disease
contributed to the death.1*
J
Liability under a policy indemnifying against liability for bodily!
injuries arising out of the use of coal trucks should not be extended to
a result distinctly remote from the use of the truck, although the chain1
of causation is not broken.18
i
Under fire and explosion policies on a grain elevator where an
explosion and fire damage the ventilating machinery with the result
that the corn deteriorates, it is of no consequence that inherent
combustible properties of the grain actually caused the deterioration1
and loss. The principle of proximate cause "applies although within the
network of causation there may be found the operation of natural
forces'' to which the contingency insured against has given place.**

?

WHAT CONSTITUTES PROXIMATE CAUSE

|§ 74:705. Generally.
\The view | is declared by some courts that in determining what
{constitutes proximate cause in insurance cases the same conditions
[apply equally in contract and tort actions.18
j^There. is authority that with respect to liability for negligence, the
[concept of proximate cause is applicable to insurance law only where
ithe question is whether a cause is the sole cause. Thus, it has been said
[that the rule of proximate cause, as applied in negligence actions, is not
fgiven full eifect in actions on policies insuring against accident; rather,
Ithe rule is that the doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in
[determining ^whether or not an injury or death is caused solely by the
fact or accident against which indemnity is given, while in ordinary
•negligence cases the proximate cause determines the existence of
Inability." J ;
10, Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v Bareficld
K1933) 187 Ark 676, 61 SW2d 698, affd
L291 US 375. 78 L Ed 999, 54 S Ct 486,
I reh den 292 US 600, 78 L Ed 1464, 54
I SCt 627. J
••••i

•

111. Henderson v Travelers Ins. Co.
, (1928) 262 Mast 522, 160 NE 415.
fl2. Singleton v Phoenix Ins. Co. (1892)
I* 132 NY 298, 30 NE 839.

11016

13. New York & Boston Despatch Express Co. v Traders' & Mechanics* Ins.
Co. (1882) 132 Mass 377.
14. Federal Life Ins. Co. v White (1929,
Tex Civ App) 23 SW2d 832, writ ref.
As to a statement that the doctrine
of proximate cause as applied to an
accident insurance policy is materially
different from the doctrine as applied in
cases of ordinary negligence, see Mc-

§ 74:706]

§ 74:706. Causal relation distinguished.
It is necessary to distinguish between causal relation and the concept
of proximate cause. Causal relation requires only a cause and effect
relationship or sequence whereas proximate cause imposes an element'

1
Burgess v Federal Life Ins. Co. (1927)
5 Tenn App 284.
15. Provident Life & Acci. Ins. Co. v Ivy
(1933) 18 Tenn App 106, 73 SW2d
7J&J 7 f?n r S? LJ£o ^ J£,A£*Uy
(1937) 130 Tex 408, 109 SW2d 972.

17. Evans v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.]
(1946) 26 Wash 2d 594, 174 P2d 961. j
I 8 - Evans v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,i
su ra
P j
19
- Schmidt v Utilities Ins. Co. (1944)
353 M o 213, 182 SW2d 181.

16. Pacific Union Club v Commercial
Union Assur. Co. (1910) 12 Cal App
503, 107 P 728.

20. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc. vi
Board of Comrs. (1944, CA5 La) 141 F
2d 600.
I
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»of nearness or proximateness of the cause to the effect or result. Thus,
a cause which is remote is not a "proximate cause," even though it is
in the line of causation. 11

Where the peril specifically insured against sets other causes in
motion which, in an unbroken sequence and connection between the
act and the final injury, produce the final result for which the insured
seeks to recover under his policy, the peril insured against will be
regarded as the proximate cause of the entire loss, so as to render the
insurer liable for the entire loss within the limits fixed by the policy.* j|f
Proximate cause is that which, in a natural sequence, unbroken by
any new cause, produces the result which would not otherwise have
occurred 7 It is to be noted that this statement confuses the concept of
causation with that of proximateness and in effect would appear to
state that as long as there is an identifiable chain of cause and effect

§74:706

v

§ 74:707, Contributing cause.
The fact that several causes contribute to the loss removes the
"necessity of proving the proximate cause of the loss.1
A contributing cause from a scientific standpoint is not necessarily a
oximately contributing cause from a legal standpoint.*
^ -£

Wt

74:708. Sole cause distinguished.
The requirement that the peril insured against be the proximate
! use of the lo<*s does not require that it be the sole cause in the
| absen - of an express policy provision to that effect.8
:
^ If the cause designated in a hail and extended coverage rider of a fire
^and lightning policy is the dominant and efficient cause of loss, the
i right of insured to recover will not be defeated by the fact that there
^were contributory causes not covered in the policy.4

Ijf *

x

f

| § 74:709. Train of events test.
g $ A cause is proximate when it sets in motion a chain of events which
^result in the loss without the intervention of any new or independent
Iforce.'
ij

%\
:|i

[21. Merchants Co. v Hartford Acci &
llndem. Ca (1939) 187 Miss 301, 188
So 571, sugg of error overr 187 Miss
309, 192 So 566.

E

specifically excluded Avis v Hartford
Fire Ins Co (1973) 283 NC 142, 195
SE2d 545, revg 16 NC App 588, 192
SE2d 593
3. Marks v Lumbermen's Ins Co (1946)
160 Pa Super 66, 49, A2d 855

| £ Miller v Mutual Ben L Ins. Co
; (1871) 31 Iowa 216.
^I
*
Evana Plantation, Inc v Yorkshire
|2» Equitable' Life Assur. Soc v Gratiot 4. Ins
Co. (1952) 214 Miss 321, 58 So 2d
% ( l 9 3 3 ) 4 $ W y o l , 14 P2d 438
797
Under Iowa law, where a party is
I suffering from a pre-existing disease 5. Milwaukee & S P R Co v Kellogg
(1877) 94 US 469, 24 L Ed 256, quoted
• and an accident occurs thereafter, even
m Lynn Gas & Electric Co v Menden
* though the disease itself may have had
Fire Ins Co. (1893) 158 Mass 570, 33
some contributing remote role in the
NE 690; National Life & Acci Ins Co.
death, nevertheless, such a disease is
v McGhee (1939) 238 Ala Ail, 191 So
only a condition and not the proximate
884, Berry v United Commercial Travcause of death. Continental Casualty
elers (1915) 172 Iowa 429, 154 NW
Co. v Jackson (1968, CA8 Iowa) 400
598, Tracy v Palmetto Fire Ins Co.
F2d285.
(1928) 207 Iowa 1042, 222 NW 447;
* Generally, coverage will extend when
Federal
Life Ins Co v Raley (1935,
s damage results from more than one
Tex Civ App) 81 SW2d 220, revd on
[cause even though one of the causes is

•1018

§ 74:709

other grounds 130 Tex 408, 109 SW2d
step may have been excepted risk tnere
972 See, Kuntz v Spence (1931, Tex
was coverage under policy applicable to
Civ App) 48 SW2d 413, judgment revd
vandalism and malicious mischief for
on other grounds (Tex Com App) 67
loss that occurred when vandals drove
SW2d 254
truck into air conditioner and caused
When a peril results in the owner's
blockage of drain that resulted in water |
losing control over insured property,
backup and damage to insured's mven-^
tory, notwithstanding exclusion from*
any subsequent damage to or loss of
policy for loss caused or contributed to
the property is attributable to the peril
by water backing up through sewers or
causing the loss of control, and the
drains Franklin Packaging Co. v Call-*
proximate cause of the loss resulting
forma
Union Ins Co (1979) 171 N"
from a taking followed by destruction
Super 188, 408 A2d 448.
U
is determined by the nature of the
IA
taking Although the events immediately preceding the taking may proxi- 6. German Sav & Loan Soc. v Commei
cial U Assur Co (1910, CA9 Cal) 18
mately cause a loss, the events followF 758, Kokomo Life & Ace. Ins. Co. <
ing a taking may not. Pan American
Wolford (1929) 90 Ind App 395, 16'
World Airways, Inc v Aetna Casualty
NE
156, Quails v Farm Bureau Mul
& Surety Co (1974, CA2 NY) 505 F2d
Ins Co (1971, Iowa) 184 NW2d 710
989
Lynn Gas A Electric Co v Meridet
Where gasoline hose assembly leaked
Fire Ins Co (1893) 158 Mass 570/3^
causing fire on barge, property damage
NE 690, Cova v Bankers & Shipper]
liability policy issued to manufacturer
Ins Co (1937, Mo App) 100 SW2d 23:
of hose assembly covered salvage claim
Clouse v St Paul Fire & Marine Ins
agamst barge's owners by owner of
Co (1950) 152 Neb 230, 40 NW2d
tugboat for expenses incurred in remov820, 15 ALR2d 1008, Druhl v Equit*
ing barge to safety and helping to put
ble Life Assur Soc (1928) 56 ND 517,
out fire since penis specifically insured
218 NW 220, Gowans v Northwestern
against set other causes in motion
Pacific Indem Co (1971) 260 Ore 618,
which, in unbroken sequence and con489 P2d 947 46 ALR2d 398, ren den
nection between act and final loss, pro260 Or 624, 491 P2d 1178; Maness v
duced results for which recovery was
Life & Casualty Ins Co (1930) 161
sought Goodyear Rubber & Supply
Tenn 41, 28 SW2d 339, Proffitt v ProvInc v Great American Ins. Co (1976,
idence Washington Ins Co. (1950, Tex
CA9 Or) 545 F2d 95
Civ App) 234 SW2d 894, aflfd 150 Tex
207, 239 SW2d 379
pi
Under rule that recovery may be
allowed if insured risk set into opera- 7. Delametter v Home Ins. Co. (1938)'
tion chain of causation in which last
233 Mo App 645, 126 SW2d 262.
| |
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|thc initiating event is to be deemed the "proximate'* cause.
It ^Illustrative of the train of events situation, it has been held that a
^proximate cause is the cause that naturally and probably leads to the
result; the' cause that in the existing conditions would be reasonably
^expected to produce the result; the cause which in natural and
^continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause
'produces the result and without which the result would not have
ipecurred/i;
•^Similarly it has been held that defining it as "that cause which in
fnatural and continuous sequence unbroken by any new cause, produces
fdeath, and without which death would not have occurred" was not
ferroneous for failure to include the clement of "foreseeableness and
.anticipation of an injury or the result of such injury."*

A direct and proximate cause is the active and efficient cause that
sets in motion a train of events which bring about a result without the
intervention of any force, starting and working actively and efficiently
from a new and independent source. 1 '
, n <*
In some instances the terms have been coupled to serve as a qualifier
to speak of the proximate cause as the "predominating efficient one." 14
So it has been held that where there is no order of succession in time
and there are two or more concurrent causes of law, the predominating
efficient one must be regarded as proximate regardless of the position
of the event as to time. The cause which sets the other in motion and
clothes it with the power to harm at the time of the disaster must rank
as predominate. 15 That is to say, proximate cause is not necessarily the
last link in the chain of events, but that which is the procuring,
efficient, and predominant cause, that from which the effect might be
expected <to follow, without the concurrence of any unforeseen circumstances. 16
1

§ 74:710. —Foreseeability.
In some instances, cases have qualified the train of events concept by
the requirement, characteristic of tort law, of the element of foreseeability, holding that a cause is not proximate unless the harm sustained
was a foreseeable consequence thereof.1'
i

§ 74:711* Efficient cause.
* In some cases, the concept of proximate cause is defined in terms of
the efficient cause or the efficient moving cause. Thus, it has been said
that the proximate cause of the happening of a contingency insured
against is the fundamental, efficient moving cause thereof.11 Similarly, it
has been said that proximate cause is the efficient cause; the one that
necessarily sets the other causes in motion."
S, Cramer v John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co. (1940) 18 NJ Misc 367, 13
A2d 651.
* „
.
w
9. Provident Life & Acci. Ins. Co. v Ivy
(1933) 18 Tenn App 106, 73 SW2d
706; Provident life & Acci. Ins. Co. v
Holt (1930, Tex Civ App) 27 SW2d
556, writdiamwoj.
10. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v Stintoo (1940, CA6 Mich) 111 F2d 63, cert
den 311 US 667, 85 L Ed 428, 61 S Ct
25; National Life & Acci. Ins. Co. v
McGhee (1939) 238 Ala 471, 191 So
884; Unkelabee v Homestead Fire Ins.
Co. (1945, Mun Ct App Dist Col) 41
A2d 168; Bouchard v Prudential Ins.
,Co (1937) '
Me 238, 194 A 405;

1020

Freeman v Mercantile Mut. Ace. Ass'n
(1892) 156 Maw 351, 30 NE 1031,
quoted in Berry v United Commercial
Travelers (1915) 172 Iowa 429, 154
N W 59 g. Maness v Life & Casualty
I n s , C o # (1930) 16I Tenn 41, 28 SW2d
339
U. Park Saddle Horse Co. v Royal Indera. Co. (1927) 81 Mont 99, 261 P
ggo
_
n
t ^ ^
12. Port Washington Nat. Bank & Trust
Co, v Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1937) 253
App Div 760, 300 NYS 874.
Remote causes of causes are not
relevant to the characterization of an
insurance loss. In the context of an
action by an airline against its insurers

to recover for losses resulting from the
hijacking and destruction of an aircraft,
the causation inquiry stops at the efficient physical cause of the loss, it does
not trace events back to their metaphysical beginnings. The words "due to
or resulting from" as used in the airline's insurance policy to exclude coverage of losses from certain specified perils limit the inquiry to the facts immediately surrounding the loss. Pan
American World Airways, Inc. v Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. (1974, CA2
NY) 505 F2d 989
In determining whether a loss is
within an exception in a policy, where
there is a concurrence of different
causes, the efficient cause—the one that
sets others in motion—is the cause to
which the loss is to be attributed,
though the other causes may follow it
an operate more immediately in producing the disaster. Sabella v Wisler
(1963) 59 Cal 2d 21, 27 Cai Rptr 689,
377 P2d 889; Sauer v General Ins. Co
(1964, 2d Dist) 225 Cal App 2d 275, 37
Cal Rptr 303.
In the determination of whether a
loss is within an exception in a policy,
where there is a concurrence of two
causes, the efficient cause, i.e., the one
that sets the other in motion, is the

§ 74:7H

cause to which the loss is to be attributed, though the other cause may follow it and operate more immediately in
producing the disaster. Frontis v Milwaukee Ins. Co. (1968) 156 Conn 492,
242 A2d 749, citing Couch 2d.
* £.$
In action to recover under all-risks
policy in which insured contended loss
had been caused by mud flow and
insurer chimed it had been caused by
or aggravated or contributed by surface
water within meaning of policy exclusion, relevant inquiry was to determine
which was dominant and efficient cause
of loss; particularly since proof was
largely dependent on expert and eyewitness testimony as to how damage occurred, issue had to be determined by
trier of fact. Molycorp, Inc. v Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co (1980, 1st Dept)
78 App Div 2d 510, 431 NYS2d 824.JL*

13. Kokomo Life & Ace. Ins. Co.fv
Wolford (1929) 90 Ind App 395, 167
NE 156.
, *#

; S%
14. Princess Garment Co. v Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co. (1940, CA6 Ohio) 115

™ 380.

y^

15. Princess Garment Co. v Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., supra.
16. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v Sikes
(1946) 197 Okla 137, 168 P2d 1016.M

m
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f An accident which was the efficient or predominant cause of an
injury has been held to satisfy the requirement that the injury result
^directly, independently and exclusively" from an accident.17 It is to be
fnoted that such a conclusion in effect eliminates the qualifications of
^'independently" and "exclusively," for such terms would appear to
exclude.the existence of any contributing cause.

§ 74:714, Nearest cause.
Where an efficient cause nearest the loss is a peril expressly insured
against, the insurer is not to be relieved from responsibility by showing
that the property was brought within that peril by a cause f not
mentioned in the contract.1
The rule is settled in the law of insurance that the cause nearest the
loss is to be considered, and that distant causes are to be disregarded.* J
In contrast, however, it is declared that where an earlier cause ts*the
proximate cause because it has initiated a train of events, it follows that
any of the later events are themselves not regarded as the "proximate"
cause even though they may be nearer in time and place to the loss.

§ 74:711

[§ 74:712. Direct cause.
m In some instances, the attempt has been made to define proximate
[cause in terms of directness. The words "direct cause" are synonymous
r
in legal intendment with "proximate cause."1*
i A cause is deemed the proximate cause if it is shown to have led to
fthe loss and no intervening act occurs which is more directly responsible Tor the *^oS.19
§ 74:713. "But for" cause.
In denning proximate cause, it has been held that the peril insured
against must be the sole proximate cause of that loss, so causing and so
connected with the loss that it could not otherwise have been produced.1

'4

17. Carnelious v Louisiana Industrial Life
Ins. Co. (1931) 18 La App 739, 138 So
»3.
|
18. Dixie Pine Product* Co. v Maryland
~ Casualty Co. (1943, CA5 Miss) 133
F2d 583, cert den 319 US 743. 87 L Ed
1700, 63 S Q 1033.
Loss is covered under a casualty
policy where directly caused by a specifically covered risk, even though indirectly and incidentally enhanced by
another peril expressly excluded from
coverage. Fawcett House, Inc. v Great
Cent Ins, Co. (1968) 280 Minn 325,
159 NW2d 268.
19. United States Mut. Acci. Asso v
Barry (1889) 131 US 100, 111, 113, 33
L Ed 60, 64, 65, 9 S a 755.
In action to recover under policy
applicable to "direct loss" from wind
by insured who contended that wind
had blown open gate,to cattle enclosure, permitting cattle to reach feeder
and eat amount of food that was fatal
to them, trial court properly gave m1U2

struction equating direct loss with concept of proximate cause in negligence
cases as being natural, continuous, and
unbroken cause without which loss
wou)d not have occurred, and evidence
supported jury verdict that death of
cattle was not direct loss by windstorm
Grzadzielewski v Walsh County Mut.
Ins. Co. (1980, ND) 297 NW2d 780.
20. Dyer v Piscataqua Fire & Marine Ins
Co. (1865) 53 Me 118; Mathews v
Howard Ins. Co. (1854) 11 NY 9.
In an action on a group accident
policy excluding loss caused or contributed to by, or is the consequence of, or
is in any way attributable to bodily or
mental infirmity, or disease of any kind,
it is error to define proximate cause as
the moving and efficient cause, without
which the injury in question would not
have happened, since Texas law specifically disapproves of the "but-for" test
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v Kegley (1967,
CA5 Tex) 389 F2d 348, 28 ALR3d
400, cert den 390 US 946, 19 L Ed 2d
1135, 88 S O 1033,

§ 74:716

§ 74:715. Time and distance relationship.
Where it is said that the cause tc be sought is the direct and
proximate cause, it is not meant that the cause or agency which is
nearest in point of time or place to the result is necessarily to be
chosen, since there may be a dominant cause even though concurrent
or remote in point of time or place.4
§ 74:716. Consequential loss.
Some courts have centered attention on the result rather than difthe
1. Insurance Co v Transportation Co
(1871) 79 US 194, 20 L Ed 378.
2. Trade Bank of New York v United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (1928)
132 Misc 371, 229 NYS 93, affd 222
App Div 736, 225 NYS 915, revd on
other grounds 249 NY 546, 164 NE
578
3. Insurance Co v Boon (1877) 95 US
117, 24 L Ed 395; Hartford Steam
Boiler Inspection & Ins Co v Pabst
Brewing Co (1912, CA7 Wis) 201 F
617, Clouse v St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins Co (1950) 152 Neb 230, 40 NW2d
820, 15 ALR2d 1008; Holmes v Emplovers* Liability Assur. Corp. (1941)
70 Ohio App 239, 25 Ohio Ops 25, 36
Ohio L Abs 201, 43 NE2d 746 motion
overr; Providence Washington Ins. Co.
v Cooper (1949, Tex Civ App) 223
SW2d329, wntrefnrc.
A mechanical test of proximate causation has been established for insurance cases, a test that looks only to the
"causes nearest to the loss " Pan American World Airways, Inc. v Aetna Ca-

sualty & Surety Co. (1974, CA2 NY)
505F2d989.
* «
Summary judgment was properly
granted for insurer contending that policy covering "direct loss by vandalism
and malicious mischief' but not covering water damage was inapplicable to
collapse of insured's roof under accumulated water, notwithstanding contention by insured that water accumulation had resulted from plugging of
downspout by cans thrown on roof by
unknown vandals, since neither throwing of cans nor cans themselves were
immediate physical cause of roofs collapse and since vandals, who could not
have expected damage to building
would result, had not caused "wilful
and malicious damage*' within policy
definition of malicious mischief and
vandalism Frontier Lanes v Canadian
Indem. Co (1980) 26 Wash App 342,
613 P2d 166 (disapproved on other
grounds Graham v Public Employees
Mut. Ins. Co., 98 Wash 2d 533, 656
P2d 1077).
4 ~
4. Mandles v Guardian Life Ins. Co.
(1940, CA10 Colo) 115 F2d 994; Ken1023
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proximate cause. And it has been said that loss is sustained within the
meaning of the term proximate where it is a material and necessary
consequence of the peril insured against.'

circumstance is not in any way related to the harm, even though:if
allowed to operate by itself it could produce harm. Thus it has been
held that the proximate character of the cause of death is not destroyed
by the fact that an existing disease ultimately would have resulted in
death.10

m
.m
cause as by speaking in terms of consequential loss rather than
§ 74:717. Antecedent contributing circumstance.
jg-.An antecedent contributing circumstance is generally ignored in
determining "the proximate cause. That is to say, a situation which
merely sets the stage for the later event is not regarded as being the
proximate cause merely because it made possible the subsequent loss.
For example, the explosion of gas, and not the lighting of a match, is
.the proximate cause of loss, where the explosion is caused by the
lighting of a match in a room filled with gas.*
I Likewise, 4h - estruction of a plate-glass window, shattered when
gas exploded upon its ignition by a lighted match being used to locate
a gas leak, is by explosion, and not by fire, within an exception in a
policy insuring the window against loss by fire.7
I^The fact that a policy does not refer to a loss as "solely" caused by a
[particular peril is an indication that coverage is intended although
[another cause contributes to the loss in some way.* On this rationale it
[has been held that if one clause of an insurance policy insures against
[death "solely" from accident and another against loss of life from
accidental injuries and the latter omits the word "solely," recovery may
.be had where an accidental injury aggravated a diseased condition,
although such condition contributed to and hastened death.9
[5 74:718, Antecedent independent circumstance.
»Closely akin to the antecedent contributing circumstance is the
[antecedent independent circumstance. They are alike in that neither is
[regarded as. the proximate cause. They differ in that the independent
K a e y v Occidental Ins. Co. (1940) 66
Westchester Fire Ins. Co. (1892) 44 111
ife' Otto App 284, 20 Ohio Ops 95, 32
App 429, affd 151 111 331, 37 NE 873.
W Ohio L Abe 631,34 NE2d 237.
'
,
„
w
t
j ^
*
7. Maryland Casualty Co. v Cherryvale
13. Peters v Warren Ins. Co. (1840) 39 US
Gas, Light & Power Co. (1917) 99 Kan
I 99, 10 L Ed 371; Fogarty v Fidelity &
563, 162 P 313.
* \ Casualty Co. (1935) 120 Conn 296, 180
A 458; Kenney v Occidental Ins. Co. 8. Ridgeley Protective Ass'n v Smith
(1940) 66 Ohio App 284, 20 Ohio Ops
(1932) 42 Ohio App 417, 12 Ohio L
.95, 32 Ohio L Abs 631, 34 NE2d 237.
Abs 132, 182 NE 345.
£«. Heuer v North Western Nat. Ins. Co. 9. Ridgeley Protective Ass'n v Smith,
I ; (1893) 144 HI 393, 33 NE 411; Heuer v
supra.
1024

§ 74:720

§ 74:719. Closer event as an intervening cause.
In point of time there may be a series of events or occurrences
leading up to the harm or loss sustained. Assuming that the initial
event would otherwise be the proximate cause, the question then arises
whether the train of events is broken by a later event which is nearer,
to the harm. If the conclusion is reached that the later event is the
"actor" event, the legal conclusion then follows that the earlier event is
not the proximate cause and that the later event is in fact the
proximate cause. When the later event thus interrupts the train of
events it is described as the intervening cause. Thus, it has been stated
that where a chain of events is set in motion by the peril insured
against and is broken by a new and independent cause intervening
between the peril insured against and the injury, but for which the
injury would not have occurred, the peril insured against is the remnte
and not the proximate cause of the injury.11
§ 74:720. —Closer event immaterial.
When the intervening occurrence is not regarded as breaking the]
causal chain, it follows that the last cause is not the proximate cause. *jj
That is to say, the fact that there is a subsequent act or event does not
necessarily mean that the initiating cause is the proximate cause of the
harm or loss.1* This in effect is merely giving expression to whatisj
implicit in every "train of events" situation; namely, that the original!
event is the proximate cause. Thus it has been recognized that if thej
secondary cause is set in motion or operation by the primary cause, ori
if such operation is controlled, directed, or influenced in its action or^
behavior by the primary cause, then the secondary cause is not an

m
10. Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v Barron
(1932) 186 Ark 46, 52 SW2d 733.
11. Fogarty v Fidelity & Casualty Co.
(1935) 120 Conn 296, 180 A 458; Hardin Bag & Burlap Co. v Fidelity &
Guaranty Fire Corp. (1941, La App) 1
So 2d 830, adhered to (La App) 5 So
2d 390, revd on other grounds 203 La

778, 14 So 2d 634; Federal Life In*.
Co.z av Raley
(1937) 130 Tex 408, 109.
*
*'z'
M
n . McCargo v New Orleans Ins. CoJ
(1845, La) 10 Rob 202.
%
%{
13. Mulier v Globe & Rutgers Fire In*.
Co. (1917, CA2 NY) 246 F 759.

§74:720

COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d

• it"

independent cause nor a contributing cause operating in parallel, but
operates in series and is a result of thefirstcause.14
t The intervening negligent acts of a third party which are reasonably
to be anticipated do not break the causal relationship.1*
Injuries sustained by the plaintiff were proximately caused by the
negligence of her husband, the insured, under an automobile liability
policy^ where, apparently not having seen a cow crossing the road, he
struck her with his automobile. The animal was injured and stunned
and, upon recovering consciousness, ran into the plaintiff, who had
returned to the road after going to the farm buildings to tell the owner
about the injury to the cow. Plaintiff was knocked down and suffered
^injuries.**
$ 74:721* Independent concurrent cause.
v- It is necessary to distinguish between the problems of proximate
cause and a train of events, on the one hand, and separate losses
sustained because of independent causes, on the other. If the insured
sustains a loss which is partly due to a covered cause and partly to one
which is not covered and it is possible to allocate to each the amount
of loss caused thereby, it is apparent that the insurer is only liable for
that part of the total loss which is shown to have been the result of the
"covered" cause.17 Conversely, it is held that where two causes join in
causing an injury, one of which is insured against, the insured is
covered by the policy.11
14. Browning v Equitable Life Assur.
£ Soc. (1983) 94 Utah 570, 80 P2d 348.
*'
-4« * ,
15. Szymanska v Equitable Life Ins. Co.
(1936)
37 Del 272, 183 A 309.
;
-** » ? « - .. -p— i
» J
/-. rtnAi\
1
(
}
%5TSE
H U ^ M f e
WU 188, Z8 NW2d 306.
17, Insurance Co. v Transportation Co.
(1871) 79 US 194, 20 L Ed 378; Lum. mei v National Fire Ins. Co. (1926) 50
SD 502, 210 NW 739
T ...tLi ««-I~J *
* u- u J
t
Insured failed to meet his burden of
; proving that ram, loss from which was
exclusion pleaded by insurer, was not
proximate cause of partial collapse of
roof from accumulated water during
wind and rain storm, or that, if rain

1026

was proximate cause, loss resulting
from it could be segregated from loss
caused by wind, where, though insured
showed that tar paper had blown off
and blocked -roof drain and that wind
w
»s therefore also proximate cause, it
was
"disputed that collapse would not
h a v e occurr^
b u t f o r subsequent accumulation of water during heavy rain,
and
wh«re. rain and wind having been
established by evidence as concurrent
causes, insured made no attempt to
determine amount of loss caused solely
b
wind United Statcs Firc Ins ^
v
Matchoolian (1979, Tex Civ App 14th
Dist) 583 S W 2 d m

writ rcf n r c

18. Zimmerman v Continental Life Ins.
Co. (1929) 99 Cal App 723, 279 P 464.
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be added amounts related to defendant's
expenditures under the lease for improvements, and pre-payment of the
mortgage note. I find that the fair
value of the property sold to the defendant on December 30, I960 was, on that
day, not less than $700,000.00; and that
defendant knowingly received from Railroad, as a rebate or concessionary offset against traffic charges, valuable
consideration from the sale in the
amount of $221,1:53.00.
The United
States is entitled to recover $663,399.00
as treble damages from the defendant.
Order accordingly.
APPENDIX TO FOOTNOTE 4
See In re Port Auth. Trans-Hudson
Corp., 48 Misc.2d 485, 265 N.Y.S.2d 925
(Sup.Ct.1965), 50 Mi.sc.2il 613, 271
N.Y.S.2d 95 (Sup.Ct.), 52 Misc.2d 943,
277 N.Y.S.2d 999 ( S u p . C D ,
modified,
27 App.Div.2d 32, 276 N.Y.S.2d 283
(1966), modified, 20 N.Y.2d 457, 285
N.Y.S.2d 24, 231 N.E.2d 734 (1967),
cert, denied sub nam. Port Auth. TransHudson Corp. v. Hudson Rapid Tubes
Corp., 390 U.S. 1002, SS S.Ct. 1244, 20
L.Ed.2d 103 motion for leave to file bill
of complaint denied sub nom. New Jersey v. New York, 390 U.S. 1000, 88 S.Ct.
1243, 20 L.Ed.2d 102 (1968) (condemnation of unprofitable s u b w a y ) ; Appleton
Water Works Co. v. Railroad Comm'n,
154 Wis. 121, 142 N.W. 476, 47 L.R.A.
N.S. 770 (1913) (acquisition of unprofitable waterworks) ; In re City of Oroville,
[1922E] P.U.R. 451, 467-72 (Cal.R.R.
Comm'n) (acquisition of unprofitable
gas s y s t e m ) ; In re City of Washburn,
[1924D] P.U.R. 368 (Wis.R.R. Comm'n)
(acquisition
of
unprofitable
waterworks) ; International Ry. v. Niagara
Parks Comm'n, [1937] 3 D.L.R. 305
( P . C ) , rev'g [1936] 1 D.L.R. 737 (Ont.
Ct.App.1935) (acquisition of unprofitable trolley l i n e ) ; In re Ottawa &
Gloucester Road Co., 69 D.L.R. 486, 487
(Ont.Sup.Ct.), appeals
dismissed,
69
D.L.R. 486, 493 (Ont.Sup.Ct, App.Div.
1921) (acquisition of unprofitable private toll roads). See also Raja Vyricherla
Narayana Gajapatiraju and The Revenue
Divisional Officer, Vizagapatam, [1939]

A.C. 302, 312 (P.C. India)
of unused s p r i n g ) :

(acquisition

The compensation must be determined
* * * by reference to the price
which a willing vendor might reasonably expect to obtain from a willing
purchaser. The disinclination of the
vendor to part with his land and the
urgent necessity of the purchaser to
buy must
alike be
disregarded.
Neither must be considered as acting
under compulsion. This is implied in
the common saying that the value of
the land is not to be estimated at its
value to the purchaser. But this does
not mean that the fact that some particular purchaser might desire the land
more than others is to be disregarded.
The wish of a particular purchaser,
though not his compulsion, may always
be taken into consideration for what
it is worth.
See (jeneralUj Comment, Valuing an Unprofitable Business Taken for Continuing Public Use, 68 Colum.L.Rev. 977
(1968).

V

KEY NUMBER SYSTEM,

Richard L. WYATT and Marie G. Wyatt,
Plaintiffs,
v.
NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. OF SEATTLE, Defendant
and Third-Party Plaintiff,
v.
J. A. DANENS AND SON, INC., Third
Party Defendant and Fourth-Party
Plaintiff,
v.
POPPLER-CARDARELLE, INC., FourthParty Defendant.
No. 4-69 Civ. 186.
United States District Court
D. Minnesota,
Fourth Division.
Oct. 7, 1969.

Action on all-risk
homeowners'
policy. On defendant's motion for sum-
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mary judgment, the District Court,
Neville, J., held that exclusionary clause
in all-risk homeowners' policy for "loss
caused by, resulting from, contributed
to or aggravated by any earth movement,
including but not limited to earthquake,
landslide, mud flow, earth sinking, rising
or shifting" would not be applicable if
movement of earth which resulted in
damage to plaintiffs' home was caused
by actions of third or fourth-party defendants in excavating contiguous property adjacent to plaintiffs' home.
Motion denied.

Insurance C=3417.5(l)
Exclusionary clause in all-risk homeowners' policy for "loss caused by, resulting from, contributed to or aggravated by any earth movement, including
but not limited to earthquake, landslide,
mud flow, earth sinking, rising or shitting" would not be applicable if movement
of earth which resulted in damage to
plaintiffs' home was caused by actions of
third or fourth-party defendants in excavating contiguous property adjacent to
plaintiffs' home.

Robins, Davis & Lyons, by James L.
Fetterly, Minneapolis, Minn , for plaintiffs.
Mordaunt, Walstad, Cousineau & McGuire, by Harold J. W. Sweet, Minneapolis, Minn., for defendant.
Meagher, Goer, Markham & Anderson,
by Wm. Robert Nelson, Minneapolis,
Minn., for third-party defendant.
Richards, Montgomery, Cobb & Bassford, by Nathan A. Cobb, Minneapolis,
Minn., for fourth-party defendant.
N E V I L L E , District Judge.
This m a t t e r is before the court on defendant's motion for summary judgment
asserting t h a t there is no genuine issue
of material fact as to the assertions
made in plaintiff's complaint. Diverse
citizenship and appropriate amount in
controversy are present.

Plaintiffs, homeowners in Minnesota,
allege that they purchased from defendant insurance company, a foreign corporation, what is known as an all risk
homeowners' insurance policy;
that
while said policy was in force plaintiffs'
home was damaged under circumstances
within the coverage of the policy; that
plaintiffs have suffered damage in the
amount of $30,000. Defendant's answer
admits the issuance of an insurance policy to plaintiffs but assorts an exclusion
contained therein to the effect t h a t the
Company is not liable:
" *" * * for loss caused by, resulting
from, contributed to or aggravated by
any earth movement, including but not
limited to earthquake, landslide, mud
flow, earth sinking, rising or shifting;
unless loss by fire or explosion ensues,
and this Company shall then be liable
only for such ensuing loss r "* *."
In due course after commencement of
this action defendant served a thirdparty complaint upon J. A. Danens and
Son, Inc. alleging subrogation rights and
claiming that damage to plaintiffs' home,
if anv, was caused by the negligence of
third-party defendant a n d / o r its agents
in excavating contiguous property adjacent to plaintiffs' home, therein causing
remo\al of lateial support and the "earth
movement" which caused plaintiffs' damages.
Following set vice of the thirdparts complaint, J. A. Danens and Son
served a fourth-party complaint upon
Poppler-Caidaielle, \m alleging that if
t h e i r was fault or negligence or violation
of an ordinance on the part of anv one,
such was attributable to fourth-party
defendant v\ho omplowd t h u d - p a r t y defendant to do ( \ < a \ a t i n g wo»k on the
contiguous pi opei t\ and w ho duected and
instructed as to the manner and place of
excavation. Hotli thud-paitv and fourthparts defendants have tiled a n s w e r herein denying culpability.
Plaintiffs take the position that the
exclusionary language above quoted was
designed and intended to exclude from
coverage damage irom natural causes and
natural phenomena; i.e., earthquakes,
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landslides, mud flow and other similar
occurrences but that where the proximate
and efficient cause of damage definitely
is the action of a third-party, this exclusion does not apply even though the actions of such third-party may incidentally have caused some "earth movement."
Plaintiffs assert that the reason for
the insertion of the exclusionary clause
above quoted in all risk insurance policies is to relieve the insurer from occasional major disasters which are almost
impossible to predict and thus to insure
against. There are earthquakes or floods
which cause a major catastrophe and
wreak damage to everyone in a large
area rather than one individual policyholder. When such happens, the very
basis upon which insurance companies
operate is said to be destroyed. When
damage i& so widespread no longer can
insurance companies spread the risk and
offset a few or the average percentage
of losses by many premiums. Looking
at the special exclusionary clause in the
policy here in question, it seems to cover
situations where one single event could
adversely affect a large number of policyholders. Besides the particular clause
which is before this court the insurer
also excludes floods, tidal waves, a back
up of water below the surface, changes
in temperature and changes in the law.
All of these are phenomena likely to affect great numbers of people when they
occur.
This gives some force to the view that
the various exclusions were not intended
to cover the situation as here where
"earth movement" occurred under a single dwelling, allegedly due to human
action of third persons in the immediate
vicinity of the damage. It seems hard
to contend that the insurance policy
meant to exclude all earth movements,
for it is difficult to distinguish between
a situation where a piece of heavy equipment breaks loose and hits a house causing serious damage and a situation where
that equipment instead hits only an embankment next to a house but causes the
earth to move and thereby damages the
house. Certainly not all earth move-

ments, or at least those where some human action causes such are included in
the exclusion. If this interpretation
creates an ambiguity in the language
then it is necessary to decide what earth
movements were intended to be covered.
The class cited in the exclusionary clause
is therefore held, if not limited to natural
phenomena, at least not to exclude coverage in the case at bar.
There is no dispute that the policy
here involved covers acts of others than
the owner. Plaintiffs urge that the proximate and efficient cause of this injury
and damage is the act of the third and/or
fourth-party defendant; that defendant
insurer itself so asserts by bringing a
third-party complaint and thus is estopped to deny the interpretation that plaintiff places on the exclusionary clause in
the policy. The court need not however
and so does not base its decision hereon
on the grounds of estoppel.
Plaintiffs cite and rely upon the cases
of Sauer v. General Ins. Co. of America,
225 Cal.App.2ri 275, 37 Cal.Rptr. 303,
304 (1964); Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal.
2d 21, 27 Cal.Rptr. 689, 377 P.2d 889
(1963); New Zealand Ins. Co. v. Lenoff,
315 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1963).
The Saner case involved an exclusionary clause identical to the one in the case
at bar. There leakage from a pipe caused a portion of the land beneath a house
to sink. The court held that the discharge of water from the pipe was the
efficient proximate cause of the damage
rather than the settling of the earth.
It added that the cause to which the
loss was attributed was the cause which
sets the earth in motion. Thus it would
appear that a distinction should be
drawn between an excluded event which
is a cause and such an event which is the
inevitable result of another event.
The further case of Anderson v. Indiana Lumbermans Mutual Ins. Co. of
Indianapolis, Ind., 127 So.2d 304 (La.
App. 2nd Cir. 1961), involved a loss under
an insurance policy which had an exclusionary clause for " [damage] caused
directly or indirectly by earthquakes or
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other earth movements, except landslides." There it was claimed that the
damage was due to other earth movements. The court noted t h a t :
« * # * T, ne position so taken is to
the effect that plaintiff alleges the
cause of the loss to be from contraction
and expansion of the earth, that such
constitutes earth movement, and. therefore, that the loss is excluded from
coverage by the exclusion clause. We
cannot so construe the clause.
As
hereinabove stated, the pronouncement
of the Supreme Court of this state
* * * requires t h a t the language
of such exemption of coverage must
be clear and specific. In this instance
'earth movements' is entirely too
general to have application to any degree of certainty. Under the 'ejusdem
generis* doctrine, the words 'earth
movement* as used in the policy must
be construed as embracing the same
general kind, class or nature of peril
as its companion words 'earthquake'
and 'landslide'. The alleged circumstances, therefore, do not w a r r a n t the
construction of 'earth movement' as
contended for by the insurer." 127
So.2d at 308.
Consistent in theory with the above
cited cases, though differing in it^ facts,
is Fawcett House, Inc. v. Great Cential
Ins. Co., 280 Minn. 325, 159 N.W.2d 2G8
(1968).
Since the court finds the interpretation contended for by plaintilis to be
sound, it is perfectly obvious t h a t there
exists a fact question for trial by the
court and jury, namely, was the movement of earth which resulted in damage
to the house caused by the actions of
third parties. If in fact at the trial it
is established t h a t actions of the third or
fourth-party defendants or others caused
such then the policy will be held by the
court to cover plaintiffs' provable damage
and the exclusionary clause held not applicable. Thus the court cannot say
that there is no material fact issue involved and thus the motion for summary
judgment must be denied. A separate
order has been entered to this effect.

VV. Willard WIRTZ, Secretary of Labor,
United States Department of Labor,
Plaintiff,
v.
PICKETT FOOD SERVICE, INC.,
Defendant.
Civ. No. 7216.
United States District Court
D. New Mexico.
July 8, 19^8.

Action by Secretary of Labor to enjoin withholding of minimum and overtime wages allegedly due under Fair Labor Standards Act, and to enforce
record-keeping provisions of the Act.
The District Court, Bratton, J., held
that a corpoiation operating a cafeteria
under contract to s e r \ e employees at a
missile range was not engaged in activities directly essential to production of
goods for interstate commerce and was
exempt as a "retail or s e n ice establishment" despite the contention that the
cafeteria was not open to the general
public, where the corporation placed no
restrictions on whom it would serve.
Order in accoidance with opinion.
1. Labor Relations C = n i O
"Directly essential" test of Fair Labor Standards Act a n e r a g e and retail
exemption aie mutually exclusne, and if
establishment is not covered by "directly
essential" test, retail exemption is available to it. Fair Labor Standards Act of
1088, ^§ 6, 7, 13(a) (2, 2<M as amended
29 U.S.C.A. ^ 206, 207, 213(a) (2, 20).
2. Labor Relations C=>1210. 1211
"Retail or service establishment"
within Fair Labor Standards Act may
be characterized as one which sells goods
or s e m c e s in small quantities to general
public and which is at very end of
stream of distribution.
Fair Labor
Standards Act of 193S, §$ G, 7, 13(a) (2,
20) as amended 29 U.S.C.A. S§ 206, 207,
213(a) (2, 20).
S«M> puhlK it ion Wouls ,m<l Thrives
lor nthri MUIK I.U t instructions and
<l« U l l l t U i I l s .
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27 Csil.Rptr. 081)
Luciano A. SABELLA et al., Plaintiffs

and Appellants,
v.
J. W. WISLER, Defendant and Appellant;
National Union Fire Insurance Company,
Defendant and Respondent.
S. F. 21146.

Supremo Court of California.
Jan. 17, 1003.

Action by homeowners against their
insurer under an all physical loss policy,
and against builder, for damages sustained
to the home us lesult of subsidence of
the supportive and nearby earth. The Superior Court, Marin County, Harold J.
Haley, Judge pro tern., entered judgment
for homeowners against builder and in favor of insurer and homeowners appealed
from portion of judgment denying relief
against insurer, and builder appealed from
judgment against him.
The Supreme
Court, White, J. pro tern., held, inter alia,
that an all physical loss home policy excluding coverage for damage sustained as
result of "settling" woidd not cover damage sustained due to house settling into the
soil thereunder to an uneven elevation to an
extent that its foundation and walls cracked
and its floor became unlcvel, if such settling
was the proximate cause of the loss, but
loss was covered if proximate cause thereof
was rupture of a sewer line from the house
permitting waste water from the house to
be emptied into loose fill under the house.
Judgment affirmed as to contractor, reversed as to insurer and cause, remanded
for new trial as to insurer's liability.
Opinion 23 Cal.Rptr. 277 vacated.
1. Appeal and Error 0=544(2)
Findings of trial court may not be
controverted on a judgment roll appeal.
2. Negligence C=»55

Doctrine of caveat emptor had no application to home buyers' claim against
builder predicated solely upon builder's
377 P 2d—56V2

negligent construction of the dwelling and
not upon misrepresentation or implied warranty.
3. Negligence <§=*55

Builder of a home was liable to buyers
for negligence in constructing the dwelling
upon an improperly compacted lot, e^en
though he did not build the home specifically
for buyers but built it generally for sale.
4. Master and Servant <&»32l

A builder of a home, as a general contractor, was responsible to buyers of the
home for defectively laid sewer pipe, even
though it might have been laid by a subcontractor.
5. Negligence 0=55

A contractor may be held liable for
damages for negligent construction of a
building even though the damage is to the
building itself as distinguished from damage
to other property; Wyatt v. Cadillac Motor
Car Division, 145 Cal.App.2d 423, 302 P.2d
655, and Fentress v. Van Etta Motors, 157
Cal.App.2d 863, 323 P.2d 227 disapproved
to extent they might be applied to contractors as distinguished from conventional
manufacturers of goods.
6. Negligence C=55

Imposition of liability upon a building
contractor for negligence in constructing a
home upon insufficiently compacted soil
eventually resulting in reduction in value of
the house by nearly 50% did not presage a
contractor's liability for any and all
imaginable defects in construction.
7. Insurance <3=H46(2)

Exclusionary language of an all physical loss policy on a residence would be
construed in the same manner that an
ordinary purchaser of insurance, desirous
of knowing what he was getting for his
money, would construe such language.
8. Insurance C=424
An all physical loss home policy excluding coverage for damage sustained as
result of "settling" would not cover damage sustained due to house settling into the
soil thereunder to an uneven elevation to an
extent that its foundation and walls cracked
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and its floor became unlevel, if such settling
was the proximate cause of the loss, but
loss was covered if proximate cause thereof
was rupture of a sewer line from the house
permitting waste water from the house to
be emptied into loose fill under the house.

Carter, Terreo & O'Connell and Loyd \V.
Carter, San Francisco, for plaintiffs and
appellants.
Bagshaw, Schaal, Martinelli, Weissick
& Jordan and A. E. Bagshaw, San Rafael,
for defendant and appellant.

9. Insurance <£=**24

Thornton & Taylor aud Jerome F.
Downs, San Francisco, for defendant and
respondent.

A house covered under an all physical
loss policy for collapse was not covered
for damage to the house as a result of
settling where the house remained usable
and continued to be occupied after the
settling.
10. Appeal and Error <§=>99l

Determination of proximate cause becomes a question of law where facts on
appeal are settled or not in dispute.
11. Insurance <§=>427

The language "but for such peril," as
used in statute providing that if a peril is
specifically excepted in a policy and there
is a loss which would not have occurred
but for such peril, such loss is thereby
excepted, means the peril which proximately
caused the loss, and the peril referred to
in the statute as the "immediate cause of
the loss" means that which is immediate
in time to the occurrence of the damage.
West's Ann.Insurance Code, §§ 530, 532.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
12. Insurance C=»424
Even if damage to a home covered under an all physical loss policy occurred as
the result of operation of forces inherent
in uncompactcd fill under the home and
defective workmanship in installation of
a sewer pipe which broke and allowed
filtration of water into the fill, the loss
was nevertheless a "risk" properly the subject of insurance as the breaking of the
pipe and consequent induction of the water
could be viewed as an unanticipated external event or casualty rather than an
inevitable occurrence.
West's Ann.Ins.
Code, § 250.
See publication Words and I'll ruses
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

W H I T E , Justice pro tern.
Defendant J. W. Wisler, the builder of a
home found to have been negligently constructed upon an improperly compacted lot,
appeals from a judgment in the amount of
$8,200 in favor of plaintiff-owners Luciano
and Diane Sabella for extensive damages
sustained to their home as a result of subsidence of the supportive and nearby earth.
The Sabellas appeal from that portion of
the judgment decreeing that defendant National Union Fire Insurance Company,
which had issued an "all physical loss" policy upon their home excluding coverage for
loss by "settling, cracking, shrinkage * *
[unless loss by collapse ensues]", was exempt from liability under the policy because
plaintiffs' loss was caused by "settling"'
within the meaning of the above exception
to the insurance coverage. The judgment
roll, plus the exhibits presented to the
trial court, constitutes the record herein.
[1] It appears from the findings of
the court below, which may not be controverted on this judgment roll appeal
(White v. Jones, 136 Ciil.App.2d 567, 569,
2S8 P.2d 913), that the factual background
surrounding this litigation is as follows:
Prior to 1953 or 1954 th< re existed in San
Anselmo, Marin County, a 'juarry site at
the base of a rook cliff wherein "a substantial pit had been excavated." During
the rainy season this pit accumulated rain
and surface water and was used by children as a swimming and wading pond. The
pit was also used over the years by individuals in the neighborhood as a dumping
place for "tree trimmings and cuttings and
other similar waste matter."
In the year prior to February 1954, a
general contracting firm filled the pit with
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p.irby dirt and rock outcropping pushed
ito the hole by carthmoving machinery,
he accumulation of "tree cuttings and
ther wa<*tc material" was not removed but
lcrcly covered over. Nor was the fill ma:rial pushed into the pit specifically coinacted or consolidated except as the weight
t the carthmoving machinery did so in the
rocess of filling. The land was then subtantially level and, since located at the base
f a substantial rock cliff, did not appear,
uperficially, to be filled land.
Defendant Wisler, an experienced home
dlder and contractor in Marin County,
itirchased the parcel of land from the general contracting firm in February lf>54.
\lthough he constructed a house thereon,
iccording to findings of the trial court "at
10 time, either before beginning construcion of said house or during its construction,
lid defendant WISLER take any steps
A'hatsove*** to inform himself of the nature,
imposition or quality of the earth upon
ivhich said house was being built." Nor
did he attempt "to inform himself whether
the earth beneath the house he was building
would support the weight of said house."
The construction of the house was undertaken without soil inspection "personally
and through [Wislcr's] agents, servants and
employees," notwithstanding that the home
was built "for the purpose and with the intent of offering said house, when completed,
for sale to the public generally/' The trial
court further found that "inquiry would
have readily disclosed that said building
site was actually, in part, on filled land,"
and that "soil tests, made by competent
soil engineers, would have disclosed that
said land was unfit for a building site because of the lack of compaction."
It was found that the appearance of the
land at the time it was purchased by
Wisler was not such that "reasonably prudent persons" in his position would have
been "alerted to the existence of fill material
in the site." But in the course of construction Wisler "personally and also through
one of his employees acting within the
-course and scope of his employment, ex-

cavated physically through and into the
unstable and unsuitable earth to a depth
of approximately 18 to 24 inches for the
purpose of preparing foundation footings
for said bouse." It was found "that a reasonably prudent person under like or similar circumstances and as a result of making
said excavations for foundation footings
would have discovered" the insufficient
compaction of the underlying earth material, and "would have caused soil tests
and investigations to be made before proceeding with the building." The trial court
specifically found that Wisler "negligently
failed to discover or notice the unsuitable
nature of said ground and failed to cause
such tests or investigations to be made."
The house was completed prior to September 1955, and offered for sale to the public. It was not in any way built especially
for the plaintiffs herein. The Sabellas
moved in to the house in October 1955. No
questions are instantly presented concerning any representations made to plaintiffs
during the purchase transactions.
It appears that there were heavy rains
during the early winter of 1955-1956, sufficient to cause a large quantity of earth and
rock to break away from the rock cliff
which rises immediately out of plaintiffs'
rear lot area, and slide into their backyard
and patio. However, apparently no appreciable earth failure or damage to the
house from subsidence occurred that winter,
or during the rainy seasons 1956-1957 or
1957-1958.
In May 1957 defendant National Union
Fire Insurance Company issued to the
Sabellas a fire insurance policy containing
an " 'All Physical Loss* Building Endorsement." National Union thereby agreed to
insure the house "against all risks of physical loss except as hereinafter excluded."
Under the subdivision "Exclusions," it was
stated: "This endorsement does not insure
against loss * * * fey termites or other insects; wear and tear; deterioration; smog;
smoke from agricultural smudging or industrial operations; rust; wet or dry rot;
mould; mechanical breakdown;
settling,
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cracking, shrinkage, or expansion of pavements, foundations, walls, floors, or ceilings;
tmless loss by * * * collapse of buddings ensues. * * V (Emphasis added.)
The trial court found that although
"there was no appreciable damage to said
house until approximately May 1st, 1959,"
sometime between Novmber 1, 1958, and
February 1, 1959, the sewer pipe from the
house began to leak at a point near the
house, causing the sewer outflow from the
house to infiltrate the unstable earth near
and below the foundation. 1 The court
found "that the cause of said sewer pipe
so breaking and leaking was either the
settling and consolidation of the inadequately compacted fill material upon which
it [the sewer pipe] was placed, or the improper closure of certain joints therein, or
a combination of both these causes."
After the sewer had been emptying water
near the foundation for at least three
months, the house settled "to uneven elevations to such an extent that its foundations
and walls cracked, its floors became no
longer level and certain of its doors and
windows could no longer be opened or
closed. The house sank in many places,
one part dropping over seven inches. Subsidence at various points in most rooms
ranged from two to six inches, although
the dwelling remained inhabitable and did
not collapse. The court found that but for
the damage the reasonable market value
of plaintiffs' home would be $18,200, but
that its reasonable market value in the damaged condition was only $10,000.
In regard to the cause of the earth
failure, the trial court made an express
finding of fact that the water escaping
from the break in the sewer line near the
foundation "infiltrated into said unstable
earth below said foundation, causinq it
[the earth] to settle and consolidate with
rapidity and causing plaintiffs house thereon to settle to uneven elevations."
(Emphasis added.)
The court also stated,
I. It would seem that a very considerable
quantity of water thus flo\\<d into the
nearby earth. Mr. and Mrs. Sabella

among its findings concerning the cruise
of action against defendant National Union,
"That it is the nature of urcompacted fills
such as that on which plaintiffs' dwelling
was constructed to settle, and that the uncompactcd fill settled as the natural result
of its own weight, the weight of plaintiffs'
dwelling thereon and the induction of waste
water from a broken house lateral sewer."
In order to be consistent with the finding
hereinbefore set forth that the induction
of waste water was the cause of the subsidence of the foundation, the finding next
above must be interpreted to state that it
is the nature of uncompactcd fills to settle
as the result of their own weight and the
weight of objects thereon such as a dwelling:
and its appurtenances, but that the abo\e
factors resulting in potential weakness in
the supportive earth were triggered to act
by the induction of the waste water from
the house, causing rapid earth compaction
and subsidence. In this connection it inibt
be noted that the Sabcllas' home suffered no
appreciable damage until the end oi the
fourth rainy season, which included the
landslide-causing rains in the winter of
1955-l°o6. It would not seem unreasonallc
to infer thai but for the break in the sewer
line, the \irtual absence of subsidence damage might have continued for SOUK tir^e.
'I he trial court further found that the
process of earth compaction and resultant
damage to the house continued from May
1, 1(>5(> until the date of judgment (October
10, 1%0) ; that such damage "is reasonably
certain to continue in the future *"or an
indefinite period of time" until the earth is
adequately compacted by natural or artifical
means, and "th.it the said process and the
damage accruing therefrom was and is the
direct and proximate result of the negligence of defendant WISLKR."
7 he Homeowners' Cause Against
the Builder
[2] Appellant Wislcr initially contends
that the judgment as to his liability should
lhed in and used the facilities of the
house, and 1'iey had two joun? chiMren.
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be reversed since he was not found to be
chargeable with misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment, and he is thus protected
by the doctrine of caveat emptor as applied
to real property. However, since Wisler's
liability is predicated solely upon negligence
in the construction of the dwelling, rather
than upon alleged misrepresentation or any
implied warranty, it does not appear that
the doctrine of caveat emptor has any application to the instant action. (See Ferguson v. Koch, 204 Cal. 342, 345, 268 P.
342, 58 A.L.R. 1176; 8 Thompson, Real
Property (1940), § 4599.)
[3] That defendant Wisler is liable to
the homeowners herein for his negligence
in constructing the dwelling upon an improperly compacted lot follows from our
holding in Stewart v. Cox, 55 Cal.2d 857,
860, 863, 13 Cal.Rptr. 521, 362 P.2d 345.
In the Stewart case a subcontractor who
negligently installed the gunite concrete
material in a swimming pool, causing water
to escape which damaged the swimming
pool itself, the surrounding yard, and the
house, was held liable for the homeowners'
damages. We stated in Stewart that whether in a specific situation a defendant will
be held liable for negligence causing harm
to the property of another "is a matter of
policy and involves the balancing of various
factors, among which are the extent to
which the transaction was intended to affect
the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to
him, the degree of certainty that he suffered
injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the
injury suffered, and the policy of preventing future harm." (55 Cal.2d at 863, 13
Cal.Rptr. at 524, 362 P.2d at 348.)
[4] Applying the foregoing principles
to the instant situation, it appears that while
this house was not constructed with the
intention of ownership passing to these
particular plaintiffs, the Sabellas are members of the class of prospective home
buyers for which Wisler admittedly built
the dwelling. Thus as a matter of legal
effect the home may be considered to have
been intended for the plaintiffs, and Wisler

owed them a duty of care in construction.
(See Prosser, Torts (2nd ed. 1955), § 36,
pp. 166-168.) It is apparent that liarm was
foreseeable to prospective owners when
the home was constructed upon the inadequately compacted earth in the lot, and it
is undisputed that the Sabellas' home was
seriously damaged. Also, there was found
to be a close connection between the negligent elements of workmanship for which
defendant contractor must be held responsible, including the placement of the
foundation of the house upon loose fill, the
laying of the sewer pipe upon an insufficiently firm footing plus the possible improper closure of certain joints in that
pipe, and the injury suffered. As the general contractor Wisler is held responsible
for the defectively laid plumbing even
though the work might have been completed
by a subcontractor. (Dow v. Holly Manufacturing Co., 49 Cal.2d 720, 725-728, 321
P.2d 736.) The trial court expressly found
that the defective plumbing installation permitted the water infiltration which in turn
caused the rapid consolidation of the unstable earth, leading to the damage to the
dwelling. Finally, the prevention of future
negligent construction of buildings upon
insufficiently supportive material would not
be furthered by exempting defendant Wisler
from liability for his negligence. (See
Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 651, 320
P.2d 16, 65 A.L.R.2d 1358; see also Buist
v. C. Dudley De Vclbiss Corp., 182 Cal.App.
2d 325, 329, 6 Cal.Rptr. 259.)
Defendant Wisler attempts to distinguish
the instant factual situation from that in
Stewart v. Cox, supra, 55 Cal.2d 857, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 521, 362 P.2d 345, in that damage to
property other than the swimming pool
there involved was foreseeable, and he
argues that the only harm foreseeable herein was damage to the house itself. But
the plaintiffs in the Stewart case recovered
for damages to the swimming pool as well
as for the damaged surrounding property.
(See 55 Cal.2d at 860, 866-867, 13 Cal.Rptr.
at 521, 526-527, 362 P.2d at 345, 350-351.)
Also, in Bause v. Anthony Pools, Inc., 205
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A.C.A. 670, 673-674, 23 Cal.Rptr. 265, the
plaintiff property owner recovered damages
from the defendant contractor for the full
cost of reconstructing a swimming pool that
was improperly made and not usable, and
one of the successful theories of recovery
was that " 'defendant designed and constructed [the swimming pool] in a careless
and negligent m a n n e r / " Moreover, we
indicated in the Stewart case that the liability of a contractor should be determined
by the consideration and weighing of the
various factors bearing upon liability hereinbefore discussed, rather than by resort
to special rules or distinctions. (See 55
Cal.2d at 863, 13 Cal.Rptr. at 524, 362 P.2d
at 348.)
[5] A further contention by the contractor is that imposition upon him of liability for his negligence in construction is
contrary to the holding in Wyatt v. Cadillac
Motor Car Division, 145 CaI.App.2d 423,
426, 302 P.2d 665. In the Wyatt case an automobile manufacturer was held exempt
from liability to the purchaser of the automobile for the negligent placement of an
obstruction within the motor, causing ruin
of the engine. It was there stated: " [ D e fendant's duty was confined to the exercise
of reasonable care to see that the car was
so manufactured and assembled as to be free
from defects which might be reasonably
expected to produce bodily injury or damage to other property.'' (FmphaMS added.)
(145 Cal.App.2d at 426, 30L' P.2d at 667,)
A result similar to that in Wyatt was
reached in Fentress v. Van Ftta Motors,
157 Cal.App.2d Supp. 863, 866, ?>2^ P.2d
227f where it was additionally held that in
order for liability to be imposed an accident must have resulted "invoking some
violence or collision with external objects."
However, the Wyatt and Fentress cases
must be deemed inconsistent with Stewart
v. Cox, supra, 55 Cal.2d 857, 861-863, 13
Cal.Rptr. 521, 362 P.2d 345, and hence
disapproved, to any extent that those cases
might be applied to contractors as distinguished from conventional manufacturers of goods. As noted above, the

plaintiffs in Stewart recovered for damages
to the swimming pool itself, the "manufactured" article there involved, and no
violent accident occurred. (See 55 Cal 2d
at 860, 866-807, 13 Cal.Rptr. at 5?6-527f
362 P2d at 350-351; Civ.Code, § 1714;
see also 32 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 197, 200, 202-203;
69 Yale L J . 1099, 1102-1103.)
[6] Defendant Wisler's final contention
is that if the judgment against him is
allowed to stand, builders of structures
will be liable to the original purchaser and
to subsequent owners for any and all
deterioration in the structures attributable
to negligent workmanship. However, imposition of liability upon Wisler for his
negligence resulting in the fundamental
defect here involved, causing reduction in
the value of the house by nearly 50 per
cent, does not necessarily presage a contractor's liability for any and all imaginable
defects in construction.
The Homeowners' Action Against
the Insurer
The Sabcllas, as appellants, contend that
the rapid and severe damage which occurred to their home was not the result of
"settling" within the terms of the exclusion
in their policy. As hereinbefore set foith,
the policy excluded coverage for loss by
termites, wear and tear, and other causes
such as mould. Following enumeration of
the latter excluded perils, the following
clause appeared excepting: "settling, cracking, shrinkage, or expansion of pavements,
foundations, walls, floors, or ceilings;
[unless collapse ensues.]"
[7.8] I»ut it appears that an ordinary
individual surveying the instant damage
could properly conclude that the house
"settled," so that placement of the word
"settling" in the exclusion clause would
convey to the ordinary person reading
the policy exceptions (Prickctt v. Royal
Ins. Co. Ltd., 56 Cal.2d 234, 238, 14 Cal.
Rptr. 675, 363 P.2d 907), the meaning that
the type of subsidence loss herein was meant
to be excluded from coverage. It should
be noted that the understanding as to non-
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coverage here relevant is that of the ordinary purchaser of insurance, desirous of
knowing what he is getting for his money.
(Ransom v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
43 Cal.2d 420, 424-425, 274 P.2d 633;
Pacific etc. Co. v. Williamsburgh, 158 Cal.
367, 375, 111 p. 4.) While somewhat more
clarity of statement might be desirable
from the standpoint of the average lay
purchaser of insurance, it would appear
that the present exception was sufficiently
understandable by an ordinary reader.
[9] Furthermore, defendant National
Union correctly argues that the insurance
contract excluded with sufficient clarity all
loss by settling, whether gradual or rapid,
unless collapse of the dwelling ensued, and
since the house remained usable and continued to be occupied, it cannot be said that
any "collapse" occurred. Thus the case
at bar is not a proper one for application
of the rule advanced by plaintiffs that
"'[PJrovisos and exceptions must be
strictly construed against the insurer, who
is bound to use such language as to make
the conditions, specifications and provisions
thereof clear to the ordinary mind, and, in
case it fails to do so, any ambiguity or
reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor
of the assured.'" (Prickctt v. Royal Ins.
Co. Ltd., supra, 56 Cal.2d 234, 237, 14
Cal.Rptr. 675, 677, 363 P.2d 907, 909.)
Respondent National Union additionally
contends that the reasoning in Prickctt v.
Royal Ins. Co. Ltd., supra, 56 Cal.2d 234,
14 Cal.Rptr. 675, 363 P.2d 907, indicates
that the instant policy exclusion should be
deemed to encompass the damage herein.
In Prickctt, the policy excluded coverage
for "normal settling," and we held that
the sudden drop of up to 12 inches of portions of a house due to improperly compacted fill beneath the house was not
"normal settling" within the terms of that
policy (See 56 Cal.2d at 238, 14 Cal.Rptr. at
677, 363 P.2d at 909.) But since the instant
policy excludes merely "settling," without
use of qualifying adjectives such as "normal" or "usual," the policy herein does

indicate an intent to exclude any and all
loss caused by settling, and settling did
occur herein.
Plaintiff Sabellas alternatively and correctly argue, however, that defendant National Union is liable because the rupture
of the sewer line attributable to the negligence of a third party, rather than settling,
was the efficient proximate cause of the
loss. The policy excepted loss by settling,
and the findings of the court below indicate
that the broken sewer line emptied waste
water into the loose fill, setting in motion the
forces tending toward settlement. As stated
in 6 Couch, Insurance (1930), § 1466,
" [ I ] n determining whether a loss is within
an exception in a policy, where there is
a concurrence of different causes, the efficient cause—the one that sets others in motion—is the cause to which the loss is to
be attributed, though the other causes may
follow it, and operate more immediately
in producing the disaster." The virtual
absence of subsidence damage in the prior
four years of the existence of the house
here in question clearly indicates that the
broken pipe was the predominating or moving efficient cause of the loss. (See 6
Couch, Insurance (1930), § 1463, p. 5298.)
[10] While defendant National Union
contends that the trial court made a finding
of fact "that the proximate cause of said
loss was settling," the above finding was
made as a part of the following conclusion
of law: "That the cause of loss and damage to plaintiffs' dwelling is excluded by
the terms of the policy of insurance issued
by defendant NATIONAL, in that the
proximate cause of said loss was settling."
But the latter conclusion by the trial court
concerning the proximate cause of the loss
is not binding upon this court on the instant
judgment roll appeal, since where the facts
on appeal are settled or not in dispute,
the determination of proximate cause becomes a question of law. (Burdett v.
Rollcfson Construction Co., 52 Cal.2d 720,
726, 344 P.2d 307; Stasulat v. Pacific Gas
and Electric Co., 8 Cal.2d 631, 638, 67 P.2d
678.)
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The instant prohlem in proximate causation is similar in principle to that in Brooks
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 27 Cal 2d
305, 163 P.2d 689, wherein recovery was
allowed on a policy insuring against death
by accidental means where the insured,
while suffering from incurable cancer, an
excluded peril, died in a fire. It was there
stated: "[Rjecovery may be had even
though a diseased or infirm condition appears to actually contribute to cause the
death if the accident sets in progress the
chain of events leading directly to death,
or if it is the prime or moving cause/' (27
Ca1.2d at 309-310, 163 P.2d at 691.) Similarly, in Hanna v. Interstate Business
Men's Accident Ass'n, 41 Cal.App. 308, 182
p. 771, recovery was allowed on a policy
covering death from external or violent
means, but limiting recovery for hernia
injuries, where a blow on the chest caused
a hernia resulting in death. The court held
that under the established rules governing
proximate causation as applied to insurance
cases, ''the hernia must he regarded as the
result of the accident, and the accident
itself, and not the resultant hernia, as the
cau«c of the death." (41 Cal.App. at 310,
182 p. at 77Z; see Note 108 A.L.R. 6.)
Also relevant is Noi a*ich Union Fire Ins.
Soc. v. Board of Commissioners (5 Cir.,
1944), Ml F.2d 000, where corn in storage
was insured against loss by fire but not
against loss by deterioration. A fire destroyed the machinery necessary to air the
corn and so prevent its deterioration, and
the corn decayed from inherent natural
causes. It was held that the fire was the
proximate cause of the loss of the corn,
even though the excepted peril of deterioration immediately caused the loss. (141
F.2d at 602; set Edgeiton & Sons, Inc. v.
Minneapolis Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (1955),
142 Conn. 669, 673-674, 116 A.2d 514
[policy covers though excluded peril immediately brings about damage, where the
operation of the excluded peril is caused
by a peril insured against]; Princess
Garncnt Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.
(6 Cir., 1940), 115 F.2d 380. 383 [recovery
allowed where peril insured against causes

the action of an excepted peril resulting in
loss].)
[11] Defendant insurer attempts to establish its nonliability by re/iance upon
section 532 of the Insurance Code, which
states that "If a peril is specially excepted
in a contract of insurance and there is a
loss which would not have occurred but
for such peril, such loss is thereby excepted even though the immediate cause
of the loss was a peril which was not
excepted." The insurer's argument is that
since in a factual sense the loss herein
would not have occurred "but for" the
settling of the underlying earth and house,
the plaintiffs are thereby exempt from coverage for this loss. But section 532 must
be read in conjunction with related section
530 of the Insurance Code (Pacific etc. Co.
v. Williamsburgh, supra, 158 Cal. 367, 372,
111 P. 4), and section 530 provides that "An
insurer is liable for a loss of which a peril
insured against was the proximate cause,
although a peril not contemplated by the
contract may have been a remote cause of
the loss; but he is not liable for a loss of
which the peril insured against was only a
remote cause." Tt is thus apparent that if
section 532 were construed in the maimer
contended for by defendant insurer, wiierc
an excepted peril operated to anv extent in
the chain of c msation so that the resulting
harm would not have occurred "but for''
the excepted peril's operation, the insurer
would be exempt even though an insured
peril was the proximate cause of the loss.
Such a result would be directly contrary to
the provision in sertion 530, in accordance
with the general uile, for liability of the
insurer where the peril insured agair^t
proximately results in the loss. (See 6
Couch, Insurance (1(>30), § 1464.)
It would app< ar theicforc that the
specially excepted peril allud< d to in section
532 as that "but for' which the loss would
not have occurred, is the peril proximately
causing the loss (sec Ilerron v. Smith Bros,
I n c , 116 Cal.App. 518, 521 [1], 2 P2J
1012), and the peril there referred to as the
"immediate cause of the loss" is that which
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is immediate in time to the occurrence of
the damage. (See Black's L a v Dictionary
(4th ed. 1951), "Immediate Cause," p 884;
6 Couch, Insurance (1930), § 1463, pp.
5298-5299; 28 Cal.Jur.2d, insurance, § 446,
pp. 160-161.) The latter conclusion as to
the meaning of Section 532 of the Insurance Code suggests disapproval of language
to the contrary in Hughes v. Potomac Ins.
Co., 190 Cal.App.2d 230, 245 [4|, 18 Oil.
Rptr. o50, wherein the "but for" provision
of st" Hon 532 was interpreted to refer to a
cause without which the loss would not in
fact have occurred, and without reference
to companion section 530 of the Insurance
Code.
[12] A further contention by respondent
National Union is that since the insurance
coverage herein extended to the underhuig
lot area (see Hughes v. Potomac Ins. Co.,
supra, 109 Cal.App.2d 239, 245-249, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 650), and since the damage occurred
as the result of operation of forces inherent in the uncompacted till and the defective workmanship in the installation of the
sewer outflow, it was inevitable that the
damage herein would have occurred to the
house at some time. It is argued that the
loss was not fortuitous, and hence not a
"risk" properly the subject of insurance.
(See 2 Richards, Insurance (5th cd. 1952),
p. 710.) However, it is provided in section
250 of the Insurance Code, as instantly relevant, that "any contingent or unknown
event" may be insured against, and it was
recently stated in Snapp v. State Farm hire
& Cas. Co., 206 A.C.A. 919, 922, 24 Cal.
Rptr. 44, 45 on facts also involving movement of an uncompacted rill, that: 4< [A]fter
any movement of land has occurred it
might be said to have been 'inevitable' with
semantic correctness, but such 'inevitability' does not alter the fact that at the time
the contract of insurance was entered into,
the event was only a contingency or risk
that might or might not occur within the
term of the policy." Moreover, the breaking of the sewer pipe and consequent induction of quantities of waste water into the
improperly compacted fill may be viewed
377 P.2d—57

as an unanticipated external event or casualty, operating to trigger the greatly accelerated action of possibly inherent vices.
(Compare with Chute v. North River Insurance Co. (1927) 172 Minn. 13, 14-15, 214
N.W. 473, 55 A.L.R. 938.)
The judgment is affirmed as to defendantcontractor Wisler and is reversed as to
defendant National Union, and the cause
remanded for a new trial as to defendant
insurer's liability in accordance with the
views herein expressed.
GIBSON, C. J., and TRAYNOR,
SCHAUER, PETERS, and TOBRINER,
JJ., concur.
McCOMB, J., not participating.

27 Oal.Rptr. 007
William B. GREENMAN, Plaintiff and
Appellant,
v.
YUBA POWER PRODUCTS, INC.,
Defendant and Appellant;
The Hayseed, Defendant and Respondent.
L. A. 26976.

Supreme Court of California,
In Bank.
Jan. 24, 1902.

The plaintiff who was injured while using a power tool which had been given to
him by his wife who had purchased the tool
fruin a retailer brought an action against the
retailer and the manufacturer. The jury
returned a verdict for the retailer against
the plaintiff and for the plaintiff against the
manufacturer. The Superior Court, San
Diego County, Robert W. Conyers, J., rendered judgment on the verdict. The manufacturer and the plaintiff appealed. The
Supreme Court, Traynor, J., held that the
requirement in the Uniform Sales Act that

VORMELIIER v. Oi^EKSINSKI
\> to the procedural errors raised, we
niivl them without substance. We depend
•w both the statute 1 and the court rule 2 ,
which are included as footnotes.
Certainly we perceive no suggestion of a
iniM'arriage of justice.
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"earthquake, landslide or other earth movement," the exclusion applied only where
earth movement was the sole cause of the
damage and did not apply where it was
shown that the building was improperly
constructed.
Affirmed.

We vote to affirm.

Danhof, J., dissented and filed opinion.

1. Insurance C=277

40 Mieii.App. 01*
Howard VORMELKER and Hazel
Vormelker, Plaintiffs,

Vernon Z OLEKSINSKI and Helen Oleksinski, Defendants-Third-Party
Plaintiffs-Appellees,

INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH
AMERICA, Third-Party Defendant-Appellant,

and
Leom M. Rhodes and Gerald M. Eniig,
Third-Party Defendants.
Docket No. 10457.

.. .:; t-r* A p r i l s of .Michigan,
Div. 2.
May 24, 1072.
Rehearing Denied July 5, 1072.
Released for Publication July 27, 1072.

Where proceeds of homeowners' policy
were payable to the mortgagee or lienholder, there was separate contract between the
insured and the mortgagee or lienholder
and in absence of policy provision rendering the policy void if the mortgagee makes
a fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent
misrepresentation by the lienholder to the
insured concerning condition of the house
at time lienholder sold it was not defense
in lienholder's third-party action on the
policy.
2. Insurance 0 2 6 2 , 271,1
Where, unbeknownst to vendors and
purchasers, real estate agent had cancelled
vendors' homeowners' policy and issued
new policy to purchasers and vendors were
not aware of the policy's existence, vendors could not be guilty of fraud in its
procurement and trial court properly excluded evidence of fraud in vendors' action
against the purchaser's insurer to recover
under policy as lienholder-loss payees.
3. Evidence C=2I3(I)
Offers to settle between parties to
lawsuit are not admissible.

Action by vendors against purchasers'
insurer to recover as "loss payees" under
homeowners' policy issued to insurer for
collapse of building. The Circuit Court,
St. Clair County, Halford I. Streeter, J.,
entered judgment for the vendors and the
insurer appealed. The Court of Appeals,
T. M. Burns, J., held that where homeowners' policy provided for coverage for collapse of building, but excluded loss by

Evidence that insurer had settled claim
under similar homeowners' policy, which
involved similar claim of earth movement,
with owner of property approximately 20
miles from the subject property was properly admitted in action on homeowners'
policy where it was relevant to issue of

I. M.C.L.A. $ 700.20; M.S.A. § 2S.1000.

2.

4. Evidence C^I29(I)

(H)\i IOO:J, r>20.i.
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whether damage due to an inadequate
foundation was covered by the policy.
5. Witnesses <3=>276

Vendors, who brought action against
purchasers' insurer to recover as "loss
payees" under homeowners' policy, were
entitled to call as a witness for purpose of
cross-examination the realtor and agei't
for vendors in the sale of the house who
was also the agent of the insurer who sold
the policy to the purchasers where the
knowledge realtor-insurance agent had of
the transaction of sale would be imputed to
the insurer. M.C.L.A. § 600.2161.
6. Appeal and Error C=>1050(1)

Introduction in evidence of pictures of
damaged home near the subject property,
pictures of pile drivings near the subject
property and evidence concerning repairs
done to the subject property did not, singly
or collectively, constitute prejudicial error
in vendors' action against purchasers' insurer to recover as 'loss payees" under
homeowners' policy for damage allegedly
caused by the improperly constructed foundation.
7. Parties C^56
Where vendors, who were Juiiholdcrs
under contract of homeowners' insnrai- *e
issued to purchasers, bad cause of net ion
against the insurer ami insurer w e grantid separate trial issue of its liability, case
was properly before the trial court regardless of whether the vendors improperly 'ttemptcd to join the insurer in pui chaser^
action against vendors to rescind contract
of sale.
8. Insurance C=>429.2

Whether earth movement or inadequate foundation was proximate cause of
damage to insured property was question
for jvry in action on homeowners' policy.
::

M I C M A K L I>. O ' U A I I A . l o n m - i - S u p n - n i "
i ' m i r l . ' u s i i c f . s i t I i n - n:i ih«> <'«»urt <>f

9. Insurance C=>424.2

"Collapse," as used in homeowners'
policy meant a sinking, bulging, cracking-,
pulling away of the wall so as to impair its
function of supporting the superstructure
and destroying its efficiency as a habitation.
Sec publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
10. Insurance C=>424.2

Where homeowners' policy provided
for coverage for collapse of building, but
excluded loss by "earthquake, landslide or
other earth movement," the exclusion applied only where earth movement was the
sole cause of the damage and did not apply
where it was shown that the building was
improperly constructed.

Douglas S. Touma, Touma, 'Watson &
Andrescn, Port Huron, for appellant.
Harry Riseman, Riscman, Lemke & Piotiowski, 1 )etroit, for Oleksinski.
f lerald P. Mugan. Port Huron, for Vormclker.
P.< fore DAN HOP, P. P, and T. M.
P.l'RNS andO'HARAA \\.

T. M. P.UO.'S, Judge.
This cause .'rises out of d a m a g e s occurring to a hous<- owned by defendants-third
party plain!iff:--nppellccs f l v p - i n a f t c r referred to as plaintiffs). T h e plaintiffs had
previously sold the house in question to the
Vormclkcrs wiio sued plaintiffs and obtained a j u d g m e n t of remission. That decision was appealed to this ('our* and was
affirmed. S c . V o r m c l k e r v. OhAsinski, M
Micb.App. W , 1S<» \ \ W . 2 d U 5 iV>7U.
T h e complicated fact situation was accurately and logically set forth in that upinAppi-'T- hy ;<s>i-jum»'iit pu'su.-mt to C.m-t.
IWi.'i, -Ml. • *>, $ S-\ s»^ luicndc' in lUOv
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ion and will he- used here to present
tactual background.

the

"In 1957 the (plaintiffs) < )ieksinskis
engaged one Russell Secor, a con; ractor
with extensive experience in home building in the St. C l a i r - M a r y s v i l k area nevr
t h e ' s i t e of the premises here involved.
Mr Secor did not draw :he plans. 1 hey
were furnished him by (plaintiffs) who
obtained them from another source.
"Mr. Secor, on the basis of his prior
experience, advised the (plaintiffs) that
there was 'a series of unstable s t r a t a of
soils e> tending to 120 feet below the surface' on the proposed site of the home.
He described the effect of this condition
a.- causing 'large masses of land | t o |
t«-iid ;o move at infrequent intervals.'
"The ( p l a i n t i f f s ; apparently decided to
build on the site they bad chosen, irrespective, of Mr. N v o r ' s war.ung, and u.e
home wu- completed in 1 *>S7 at a cos.1 of
some .>27,UOo.
Shortly tkci caller, the
lestano-i) disclosed, the properly was
listed for sale and remained so listed until it was sold to (the Vormclkers) in
1966.
" ( T h e V o r m c l k e r s ) took possession of
the property and moved in.
Shortly
thereafter evidence (if latent defects appeared. T h e y were of a very serious nature. Ultimately the premises, according
to the (defendants') claim, became uninhabitable. As the defects became a p p a r ent, ( d e f e n d a n t s ) learned that w h a t (the
plaintiffs) had c h a r a c t e r i z e d as some
minor' or 'temporary* repairs h a v i n g
been made, were in reality basic m a j o r
repairs necessitated by the shifting of
the land base under the home.
" T h e trial j u d g e
found
adequate
grounds for rescission and the money
judgment asked by ( V o r m c l k e r s ) .
He
granted separate trials as to the two impleaded realtors, and to the insurance
carrier."

Subsequent to the trial in the above case,
and while thai matter was on appeal, the
instant case was h e a r d by the court sitting
wnn a j u r y .
The basis of the suit was
that defendant was liable for the d a m a g e
done to the house under a policy of insurance which the realtor, Gerald Kmig, as
part of his insurance business, sold to the
Vormclkers at the time they purchased
plaintiffs' house. T h e policy named the
plaintiffs as the lienholders thereby entitling them to the benefits provided for by
the policy.
T h e policy of insurance covered losses
resulting from the collapse of the building
or any part of it but excluded losses covered by e a r t h q u a k e , landslide or other
e a r t h movement.
Expert witnesses were presented who apparently agreed that a cause of the d a m a g e
to the home was a form of earth movement. However, these witnesses also indicated that the earth movement wouldn't
have damaged the property if it would
have had a foundation built on pdes r a t h e r
than a spread foundation.
At the close of the trial, the j u r y ret u r n e d a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs,
Oleksinskis, against the defendant
Defendant's motions for a j u d g m e n t //"« obstante veredicto
and a new trial w e r e denied. D e f e n d a n t then b r o u g h t this appeal
raising seven issues, which we will discuss
in the o r d e r presented.
1. W H E T H E R
THE
TRIAL
COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
E R R O R IN R E F U S I N G T O A L L O W
T H E DEPENDANT TO
PRESENT
EVIDENCE
OE
PLAINTIFFS'
FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT OF
H I D D E N D E F E C T S AS A D E F E N S E
T O AN ACTION ON T H E INSURANCE CONTRACT?
In the V o r m e l k o r s ' s u i t l for rescission,
it was determined that the Oleksinskis h a d
fraudulently misrepresented the condition

I. Vunnolker v. Oleksinski. 32 Micli.App. 408, ISO X.W.LM 13."*> (1971).
199 N.W.2d—19
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of the property and the land contract between those parties was rescinded. In the
instant case defendant attempted to introduce evidence to prove that the plaintiffs
had committed fraud. It is defendant's position that if the Oleksinskis had not committed traud upon the Vormelkers, the
Vormelkers would have disclosed the true
condition of the property to the insurance
company and the policy would not have
been issued. Defendant further contends
that as the situation now stands plaintiffs
are being allowed to profit from their own
fraud.
[1] The policy of insurance provides
that it shall be void if the insured makes a
fraudulent misrepresentation:
"This entire policy shall be void if,
whether before or after a loss, the insured has wilfully concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance
concerning this insurance or the subject
thereof, or the interest of the insured
therein, or in the case of any fraud or
false swearing by the insured relating
thereto."
However, there is no similar provision
applying to the mortgagee.
Therefore,
since the proceeds of the poluy were pa\able to the mortgagee or, as here, the lienholder, there was created a separate contract between the insured and the mortgagee who is not subject to most of the defenses available to the insured against the
mortgagor. Citizens State Bank of Clare
v. State Mutual Rodded Fire Ins. Co. of
Michigan, 276 Mich. 62, 67, 267 N.W. 785
(1936).
[2] Although we have not been able to
locate any authority to guide u s it is apparent that there was no intent on the part
of the plaintiffs to defraud the defendant
either directly or through the Vormelkers.
At the time the land contract was executed, the plaintiffs had a homeowners policy
on the property. Normally such policies
are merely transferred to the vendees.
Here, however, unbeknownst to plaintiffs,

Mr. Emig, the realtor, as part of his insurance business, cancelled that policy and issued the present one to the Vormelkers.
Therefore, since plaintiffs were not even
aware of the policy's existence, they could
hardly be guilty of fraud in its procurement. Accordingly, we hold that the trial
judge's ruling excluding evidence of fraud
was correct.
2. W H E T H E R
THE
LOWER
COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN ALLOWING
PLAINT I F F S TO INTRODUCE INTO EVIDENCE
A
SETTLEMENT
BET W E E N T H E D E F E N D A N T AND A
T H I R D PARTY ON A SIMILAR
POLICY OF INSURANCE INVOLVING A SIMILAR CLAIM?
During the trial plaintiffs, on cross-examination, were allowed to question Mr.
Richard M. Jay, an insurance adjustor employed by the defendant, about a settlement
by defendant with the owner of a home
some 20 miles from the plaintiffs' home.
Defendant objected to this testimony on
the grounds that it was irrelevant, highly
prejudicial, and in violation of the accepted
practice that settlements and compromises
are not to be considered as evid' nee.
[3.4] It is clear that offers to settle
between the parties to the lawsuit are nit
admissible. Luce v. Stott Realty Co., 201
Mich. ?Z7 167 NAV. 869 (1918). Here,
however, we are concerned with a settlement between the defendant and a third
party. There appears to be no good reason
to exclude such evidence provided, of
course, it is relevant and material.
"Evidence of other contractual transactions between the same parties is readily received when relevant to show the
probable meaning they attached to the
terms of the contract in litigation. Likewise, when the authority of an ag^nt is
in question, other similar transactions
carried on b> him in behalf of the alleged principal are freely admitted.
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"However, when evidence of other
contracts is offered as evidence on the
issue of the terms or making of the contract in suit, the courts have shown a
surprisingly stiff attitude, beguiled perhaps by the niystical influence of the res
niter aiios acta phrase or misled by a
confusion of the requnements of sufficiency and relevancy. When the evidence offered is of other contracts between the Mime parties, they have IK en
willing to acknowledge that other similar
contracts showing a cu-tom, habit or
continuing course of deal ng between the
same parties may be received as evidence
of the terms of the piesent bargain.
Many courts, however, draw a line here
and hold that a party's other contracts
with third persons offered as evidence of
tue terms of the disputed contract are inadmissible.
"This is too inflexible and bars out information valuable to the trier. Contracts of a parts with thud persons may
.now the party's customan practice and
course of dealing and thus be highly probative as bearing on the terms of his
present agreement. Even short of such
extensive acts, when a business man has
once adopted a particular mode of handling a bargaining topic, such as warranty, discount or the like, in a certain kind
of transactions it is often easier for him
to follow the same solution in respect to
the same feature of a new contract, than
it is to work out a new one.
"No strict rules or limits of admissibility are appropriate. There is no danger
of unfair prejudice here. Seemingly, the
courts should admit the evidence of other contracts in all cases where the testimony as to the terms of the present bargain is conflicting, and where the judge
in his discretion finds that the probative
value of the other transactions outweighs
the risk of waste of time and confusion
of issues." McCormick, Evidence, § 165,
pp. 346-348.

In the instant case it was not clear just
what the "collapse clause" contained in the
insurance contract covered.
Plaintiffs
were arguing that damage due to an inadequate foundation was covered. Therefore,
they presented evidence that defendant had
settled a claim with another p.-'rty under a
similar policy for damage caused by an inadequate foundation.
It is our opinion
that such evidence was relevant for purposes of interpreting what the "collapse
clause" meant. We therefore hold that the
trial court was correct m admitting the evidence.
3. W H E T H E R
THE
TRIAL
COURT ERRED
IN
ALLOWING
P L A I N T I F F S TO CALL GERALD
EMIG AND CROSS-EXAMINE HIM
AS AN AGENT OF T H E DEFENDANT?
Gerald Emig was the realtor and agent
for plaintiffs in the sale of the bouse to
the Vormelkers. However, Emig was also
the agent of the defendant who sold the insurance policy to the Vormelkers. Plaintiffs therefore called him as a witness for
purposes of cross-examination under M.C.
L.A. § 600.2161; M.S.A. § 27A.2161.
It is defendant's position that since Emig
was the agent of both parties, the court
should not have allowed him to be crossexamined concerning the sale of the property and the disclosures that had been
made to the Vormelkers.
[5] It is clear to us that the rule of the
trial court was correct. The knowledge
Emig had of the entire transaction of sale,
i. e.f the condition of the property, what
had been disclosed to the Vormelkers, ct
cetera, at the time he, as agent for defendant, sold the insurance policy to the Vormelkers is obviously relevant since all of
that knowledge would be imputed to the
defendant. Wc therefore find no error in
allowing plaintiffs to call the witness under the statute for purposes of cross-examination.
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4. W H E T H E R
THE
TRIAL
COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR BY OVERRULING SEVER.
AL OF
DEFENDANT'S
OBJECT I O N S TO IRRELEVANCY
OR .MATERIALITY OF T H E EVIDENCE
O F F E R E D BY T H E P L A I N T I F F S ?
[6] Defendant here maintains that on
numerous occasions, over objection, plaintiffs were allowed to delve into areas irrelevant to the controversy in issue. It is defendant's position that even though each
instance, taken individually, might not constitute reversible error, when they are taken as a whole it becomes clear that the
court was prejudiced against the defendant.
Defendant first objects to the introduction of some pictures of a damaged home
owned by a Mr. Peron near the plaintiffs
and to the questioning of witness Peron
concerning the damage.
Plaintiffs also introduced pictures of
some pile drivings near Peron's home and
questioned a Mr. Davis about repairs done
to plaintiffs' home. Defendant was not allowed to show that the repairs done to
plaintiffs' home were intended to be only
temporary although it did call a witness
who testified that be was a friend of the
plaintiffs and that they had told him that
Mr. Davis had wanted to move the home
rather than repair it and that Davis had
told plaintiffs that he could not guarantee
his work.
While we agree that the evidence complained of was not particularly probative
of the issues involved, it is our opinion
that defendant was not prejudiced by its
admission. Neither the instances taken
singly nor collectively show any prejudice
on the part of the court against defendant.
Defendant was not deprived of a fair trial
5. W H E T H E R
THE
LOWER
COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN DENYING T H E DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY J U D G M E N T W H E N PLAIN-

T I F F S A T T E M P T E D TO JOIN DEFENDANT AS A THIRD PARTY IN
A PRIOR LAWSUIT?
In the original action of Vormelker v.
Oleksinski, supra, the Oleksinskis attempted to bring in defendant insurance company as a third-party defendant. Defendant
was, however, granted a separate trial, the
subject matter of which is presently before
this Court. Defendant now contends that
it was improperly joined as a third-party
defendant in that GCR 1963, 204 and 205
do not apply to the facts in this case; and,
therefore, defendant should have been
granted a summary judgment.
[7] Without deciding whether or not
defendant was fmproperly joined, we fail
to see how defendant was prejudiced thereby since it was granted a separate trial
where the question of any liability on its
part could be litigated. Therefore, any
question of proper joinder is no longer relevant.
It is clear that plaintiffs were lienholders under the contract of insurance and
therefore had a cause of action against the
defendant.
Therefore, whether or not
plaintiffs improperly attempted to join the
defendant in the prior action, the instant
case was prop< rly before the court. We
find no merit in this issue.
6. W H E T H E R
THE
LOWER
COURT ERRED IX DENYING DEF E N D A N T S MOTIONS FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AND FOR A
JUDGMENT N.O.V.?
The "collapse clause" of the insurance
policy excluded losses caused by earth
mo\ement. Defendant contends that all of
the competent testimom indicated that the
cause of the damage to plaintiffs' home
was earth movement and, therefore, a directed verdict or a judgment n. o. v. should
ha\e been granted.
[8J Both plaintiffs' and defendant's experts agreed that an inadequate foundation
could have been at least one cause of the
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damage to plaintiffs' hoiK.
Therefore,
there is a question of what the proximate
cause of the damage was th<* earth movement or the inadequate foundation. Undei
these circumstances, the t.ial court was
correct in refusing to grant either a directed verdict or a judgment n. o. v.
7. WHETHFR
THE
TRI \ L
COURTS
INSTRUCTIONS
CONCERNING THE DEI IXITION OE
THE WORD "COLLAPSE" AS IT
WAS USED IN T H E POLICY AND
I HE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS EXPLvINING
PROXIM \ T L
I AU>E
WERE ERRONEOUS*'
In IK case at bar the trial court defined
the word "collapse" as follows
"Collapse, as used in this policy, means
a inking, bulging, cracking, pulling
awa> of the wall so as to impair its
function of supporting the superstructure
and de^tro>ing its efficKnc> as a habitation '
Defendant requested a detinition which
would more or less require the destruction
of the whole building. Thus, under the
trial court's instruction, plaintiffs could recover for a "collapse" under the policy
without having to show that the house was
a total loss. Defendant contends this is error.
There is a conflict of authont> over
what the definition of a collapse should be:
"A home did not 'collapse" within the
meaning of an insurance policy covering
direct loss from a collapse of the building or any part thereof, it was held in
Central Mutual Insurance Co v Royal
(1959), 269 Ala 372; 113 So 2d 680; 72
ALR 2d 1283, where there was evidence
that the walls and the concrete foundation of the insured house had cracked,
and segments of the wall had sunk or
dropped, but there was no evidence that
the house had fallen down or caved in.
The court, after pointing out that the
word 'collapse* or the term 'collapse of a
building' was plain and clear and without

ambiguity, and meant that the entire
building must lose its distinctive character as a building, stated that where the
language of an insurance policy was
clear and unambiguous it must be construed as it read, and that courts were
not at liberty to raise doubts where none
existed or to make a new contract for
the parties. The court concluded by expressing the opinion that where some of
the nails of a house appeared to have
cracks in them, and in two or more places
the concrete footing contained cracks, but
there was no falling in or loss of shape,
no reduction to a flattened form or rubble of the building or any part thereof,
there was no collapse of the building
within the meaning of the policy.

"However, in Tra\elcrs bire Insurance Co v Whale> (1959, CA 10, Kan)
272 E2d 288, appl>mg Kansas law, where
there was no claim that the building or
any part thereof collapsed in the sense
that it tumbled down or fell in a heap,
but the court found that the basement
walls cracked and broke on the west,
north, and south walls of the residence,
that this cracking withdrew the support necessary for the first floor and
caused damage to the ceiling, rafters,
and upper walls of the first floor resulting in material damage to the structure,
that a portion of the residence had fallen, impairing the substantial integrity of
the building to such an extent as to render it unsuitable for use as a home, and
that the building was exposed to the inclemency of the weather and its contents
were more easily subject to the elements,
it was held that there was a recoverable
loss under a fire policy insuring against
a collapse of the building or any part
thereof. The court construed the word
'collapse' in the context in which it was
used by the parties in executing the insurance contract, and took the view that
the parties did not intend coverage only
where there was a complete collapse and
tumbling down of the foundation wall,
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so as to cause the superstructure to
come crashing down in a heap of rubble, but rather that there was a partial
collapse within the meaning of the policy if the foundation disintegrated by
settling, pulling away, or cracking so
that it would no longer support the
house. The court also applied the rule
that where a contract of insurance prepared by the company contained a word
susceptible of being construed, without
violence, as having more than one meaning, the meaning most favorable to the
interests of the insured, and most unfavorable to the insurer, must be adopted." 72 A.L.R.2d 1288-1289.
[9] It is our opinion that the latter approach is the better view. Jt therefore follows that we find no error in the trial
court's instruction.
[10] Defendant requested the following
instruction regarding proximate cause :
"You may, in this case, find that there
was more than one proximate cause of
the damage sustained by the Oleksinski
home. Accordingly, if you find that
there was a collapse, >ou may find that
earth movement was the proximate cause
or one of the proximate causes even
though it need not be the only cause or
last cause."
The trial court instructed the jury, however, that if they found that earth movement was the sole proximate cause of the
collapse, they should then return a verdict
of no cause for action.
It is defendant's position that earth
movement could never be the sole cause of
a collapse and the effect of the trial
court's instruction is to render the policy
illusory.
We disagree. The policy provided for
coverage for the collapse of the building,
but excluded loss by "earthquake, landslide
or other earth movement."
I. Sot* Vormolker v. Oleksinski, .'»- Mi«*h.
A pp. 49S, is!) N.W.LM H."

(11)71)

for

All of the experts agreed that earth
movement caused the damage to the house,
but there was also expert testimony that
the foundation to the house was inadequate
and that had the foundation been adequately constructed, the collapse would not have
occurred.
It is our opinion that the exclusions contained in the policy apply only when it can
be shown that earth movement ct cetera
was the sole cause of the damage. If it
can be shown that the building was improperly constructed (taking into consideration the type of soil, the geography of the
area ct cetera) and "but for" the inadequate construction the building would not
have collapsed even with the earth movement, then the damage should come under
the protection of the policy. One of the
primary purposes of a policy such as this
is to protect against faulty workmanship or
planning. It is, therefore, our opinion that
the instruction of the trial court ^was correct.
Affirmed.

Costs to appellees.

OAXHOF, Judge (dissenting).
I must dissent because I believe the trial
court erred in refusing to allow proof on
the issue of fraud.
The land contract 1 between the Vormelkers and the Oleksinskis provided that
the Vormelkers would "keep the building
now or hereafter on the premises insured
against loss and damage in a manner and
to an amount approved by the seller and to
deliver the policies as issued to the seller
with the premiums full) paid." As I view
the case the Vormelkers became the agents
of the Oleksinskis for the purpose of procuring insurance.
[ think it clear that if a principal misrepresents to his agent and the agent,
while acting as an agent, passes this misrepresentation along, the principal may be
detailed discussion of judgment of re<nsioii of tin* < nntrfu't.
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guilty of fraud

Thus, if the Vormclkers,

even though acting innocently, misrcprcsented a material fact that had been misrepresented to them by the Oleksinskis, the
Oleksinskis could be held to have committed a fraud
I would reverse and remand for a new
tm,

«• Garnishment <§=>I6
Shareholder, in derivative suit against
a n d others claiming damages for
f r a u d a n d o t h e r tortious wrongs, could not
garnish funds of the corporations for which
h e purported to act and against which he

0fflcers

claimed

n0
damages. GCR 1963, 738.14738 16, M.C.L.A. § 600.4011(1).

2. Garnishment <3»4
O

I KIT HUMBEU STSTH?

40 Mich App. 513
LeRoy HOSNER, Individually and as Shareholder, Plaintiff-Appellant,

Where complaint made claims of fraud
and other tortious conduct but made no
claim upon any defendant "evidenced by
contract," funds of defendants could not
be garnished prior to judgment. GCR
1963, 738 2 ( 1 ) , M C.L A. § 600.4011(1);
Comp Laws 1948, § 628.1.

v.
Albert F. BROWN, Individually, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Docket Nos. 5518, 5773, 7684.

Couit of Appeals of Michigan,
I)i\ 2
May 24, 1072
Released for Publication July 27, 1072
Lea\e to Appeal Denied Aug 2, 1072. ,
In shareholder's derivative suit, plaintiff appealed from order of the Oakland
County Circuit Court, Frederick C. Ziem,
J, setting aside garnishments before judgment, from order den>ing entry of default
judgment, and from judgment entered after
trial on the merits. The Court of Appeals,
Targonski, J., held, inter aha, that shareholder, in suit against officers and others
claiming damages for fraud and other alleged tortious wrongs, could not garnish
funds of the corporations for which he
purported to act and against which he
claimed no damages, that default claimed
by plaintiff for failure of defendants to
answer was properl> set aside where, at
time default was filed, no order had been
entered on two pending motions to dismiss;
and that allegations of fraud were not
equivalent to proof
Affirmed.

3. Garnishment <3=>I93

Where complaint did not set forth
requisite facts and allegations to support
garnishment affidavit stating that suit was
brought on an express and implied contract
and there appeared from the allegations in
the complaint and the affidavit no cause
for plaintiff to be "justly apprehensive
of the loss of his claim," garnishments were
properly set aside. GCR 1963, 738 2(1,3).
4. Garnishment <§=>!21«/2

The principal defendant as well as
the garnisheed defendant has standing to
attack validity of garnishments issued in
the cause. GCR 1963, 738 14-738.16.
5. Garnishment <&=>4

Where only relief sought against corporate defendants in shareholder's derivative action was that the corporations be
dissolved and the proceeds distributed to
plaintiff, there was no claim against the
corporate defendants such as would allow
plaintiff to garnishee their funds, since
garnishment would have to be dismissed
even if all of the prayers against such defendants were granted to plaintiff upon a
trial on the merits. M.C.L.A. § 600.4011;
GCR 1963, 738.2(1,3).

